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i
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether the First Amendment protects a speaker
against a state-law right-of-publicity claim that
challenges the realistic use of a person’s name or
likeness in an expressive work.

ii
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
The Defendant-Appellant below, who is the
Petitioner before this Court, is Electronic Arts Inc.
The Plaintiffs-Appellees below, who are the
Respondents before this Court, are Samuel Michael
Keller; Edward C. O’Bannon, Jr.; Byron Bishop;
Michael Anderson; Danny Wimprine; Ishmael Thrower;
Craig Newsome; Damien Rhodes; and Samuel
Jacobson.
Respondents sued two additional Defendants, the
National Collegiate Athletic Association and Collegiate
Licensing Company, but they were not parties in the
Ninth Circuit proceedings.

iii
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
Pursuant to Rule 29.6, Petitioner states that it has
no parent corporation and no publicly held corporation
owns ten percent or more of Petitioner’s stock.

iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
QUESTION PRESENTED .......................................... i
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING ...........................ii
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT ......... iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES..................................... vii
OPINIONS BELOW .................................................... 1
JURISDICTION .......................................................... 1
CONSTITUTIONAL
AND
STATUTORY
PROVISIONS INVOLVED.............................. 1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................... 2
A. Factual Background ..................................... 6
B. Procedural Background ................................ 7
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION ...... 13
I.

The Lower Courts Are In Disarray
Concerning the First Amendment Limits
on Right-of-Publicity Claims. ........................... 15
A. The Ninth and Third Circuits’
Transformative-Use Test Protects an
Expressive Work Only if the Plaintiff’s
Likeness Is “Transformed.”........................ 15

v
B. The Constitutional Test Adopted Below
Is Inconsistent With Tests Applied By
Other Courts. ............................................. 17
1. Four Circuits and Two State
Supreme Courts Have Held that the
First Amendment Protects NonCommercial Speech Depicting WellKnown People, Even if the
Depiction Is Not “Transformed.” .......... 17
2. Other Courts Engage in CaseSpecific Balancing. ................................ 20
II.

This Case Presents an Ideal Vehicle For
Addressing the Constitutional Question. ......... 23

III.

The Ninth Circuit’s Holding Is Wrong and
Conflicts with This Court’s First
Amendment Jurisprudence. ............................. 24
A. The Adopted Transformative-Use Test
Does Not Adequately Respect First
Amendment Rights. ................................... 24
B. The Transformative-Use Test Will Chill
Protected Speech Because It Is
Overbroad and Unpredictable. ................... 29
C. Case-Specific Balancing Is Equally
Problematic. ............................................... 34

vi
D. The Rogers Test Confines the Right of
Publicity to Circumstances Where Its
Application Does Not Violate the First
Amendment. ............................................... 35
CONCLUSION .......................................................... 36
Appendix A
In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name &
Likeness Licensing Litigation, No. 10-15387,
724 F.3d 1268, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 15649
(9th Cir. July 31, 2013) ................................................. 1a
Appendix B
Keller v. Electronic Arts, Inc., No. C 09-1967
CW, 2010 WL 530108 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2010) ....... 45a
Appendix C
Order Denying Rehearing, In re NCAA
Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing
Litigation, No. 10-15387 (9th Cir. Aug. 21,
2013) .............................................................................. 71a

vii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002) ..................... 25
Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964) ....................... 30
Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 ( 2001)............ 24, 25
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.,
188 U.S. 239 (1903) ................................................... 31
Brown v. Electronic Arts, Inc, No. 09-56675,
724 F.3d 1235, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS
15647 (9th Cir. July 31, 2013)...................... 10, 23, 24
Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n,
131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011) ........................... 4, 8, 26, 33, 34
Bullard v. MRA Holding, LLC, 740 S.E.2d
622 (Ga. 2013) ............................................................ 19
Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball
Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959 (10th Cir.
1996) ................................................................. 2, 22, 34
C.B.C. Distribution & Marketing., Inc. v.
Major League Baseball Advanced Media,
L.P., 505 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2007) ........ 20, 21, 28, 34
Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary
Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797 (Cal.
2001) ........................................................... 9, 16, 17, 31
Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363 (Mo.
2003) ........................................................................... 22

viii
Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339
(D.N.J. 1981) ............................................................. 30
ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing, Inc., 332 F.3d
915 (6th Cir. 2003) ...................................... 3, 5, 18, 19
Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing
Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953) .................... 2
Hart v. Electronic Arts Inc., 717 F.3d 141 (3d
Cir. 2013) ............................................... 4, 9, 16, 31, 32
Hilton v. Hallmark Cards, 599 F.3d 894 (9th
Cir. 2010) ......................................................... 3, 15, 32
Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255
F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2001) ..................................... 3, 32
Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46
(1988) .......................................................................... 29
Illinois ex. rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing
Assocs., Inc., 538 U.S. 600 (2003) ........................... 33
Kirby v. Sega of America, Inc., 144 Cal. App.
4th 47 (2006) ................................................................ 3
Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425
(Cal. 1979) .................................................................. 26
Martin Luther King, Jr. Center for Social
Change, Inc. v. American Heritage
Products, Inc., 296 S.E.2d 697 (Ga. 1982) ............... 3
Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432 (5th Cir.
1994) ....................................................................... 3, 18
Montana v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc., 34
Cal. App. 4th 790 (1995) .......................................... 22

ix
Montgomery v. Montgomery, 60 S.W.3d 524
(Ky. 2001) .................................................................. 19
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964) .......................................................................... 28
No Doubt v. Activision Publishing, Inc., 192
Cal. App. 4th 1018 (2011) .......................................... 3
Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437 (6th
Cir. 2003) ............................................................... 2, 18
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) ......... 25
Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641 (1984) .................. 25
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) ........................... 30
Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir.
1989) ....................................................................... 9, 18
Ruffin-Steinback v. dePasse, 82 F. Supp. 2d
723 (E.D. Mich. 2000), aff’d, 267 F.3d 457
(6th Cir. 2001) ............................................................. 2
Seale v. Gramercy Pictures, 949 F. Supp. 331
(E.D. Pa. 1996) ............................................................ 2
The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989) ....... 29
Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) ........................ 2
Toffoloni v. LFP Publishing Group, LLC, 572
F.3d 1201 (11th Cir. 2009) ....................................... 22
Tyne v. Time Warner Entertainment Co.
L.P., 901 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 2005) .......................... 3, 19
United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537
(2012) .................................................................... 25, 26
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460

x
(2010) ........................................................ 25, 26, 29, 34
Valentine v. C.B.S., Inc., 698 F.2d 430 (11th
Cir. 1983) ......................................................... 2, 18, 19
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748 (1976) ................................................... 35
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting
Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977) ......................................... 3, 4
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
U.S. Const. amend I ....................................................... 2
STATUTES
28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) .......................................................... 1
Cal. Civil Code § 3344(d) .............................................. 11
OTHER A UTHORITIES
John Broder, Schwarzenegger Files Suit
Against Bobblehead Maker, N.Y. Times,
May 18, 2004), at http://www.nytimes.
com/2004/05/18/national/18arnold.html ................... 3
Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, What the
Right of Publicity Can Learn from
Trademark Law, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 1161
(2006) ...................................................................... 6, 27
F. Jay Dougherty, All the World’s Not a
Stooge: The ‘Transformativeness’ Test for
Analyzing a First Amendment Defense to
a Right of Publicity Claim Against
Distribution of a Work of Art, 27 Colum.
J.L. & Arts 1 (2003) ................................................... 6

xi
Adam Liptak, When it May Not Pay To be
Famous, N.Y. Times, June 1, 2013,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/
2013/06/02/sunday-review/between-thefirst-amendment-and-right-ofpublicity.html.............................................................. 6
Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public
Image: Popular Culture & Publicity
Rights, 81 Cal. L. Rev. 127 (1993) .......................... 27
1 J. Thomas McCarthy, The Rights of
Publicity and Privacy (2013 ed.) ..................... 13, 26
Aaron Moss, When It Comes to the Right of
Publicity, Yes, Doubt (February 18, 2011)........... 17
Andrea Peterson, U.S. Court Limits How Art
Can Imitate Life, Wash. Post, Aug. 2, 2013,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.
com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/08/02/uscourt-limits-how-art-can-imitate-life/ ..................... 6
Restatement (Second) of Torts (1977) ....................... 13
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition
(1995) .................................................................... 14, 20
Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and the
Right of Publicity, 40 Hous. L. Rev. 903
(2003) ................................................................ 6, 25, 27
Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Money as a
Thumb on the Constitutional Scale:
Weighing Speech Against Publicity Rights,
50 B.C. L. Rev. 1503 (2009) ....................................... 6

1
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the Ninth Circuit affirming the denial
by the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California of Petitioner’s special motion to
strike pursuant to California’s anti-SLAPP statute is
reported at 724 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2013) and
reproduced at Appendix to the Petition (“Pet. App.”)
1a. The order of the Ninth Circuit granting Petitioner’s
subsequent motion to stay the mandate pending
proceedings in this Court is unreported and reproduced
at Pet. App. 71a.
An opinion of the District Court denying
Petitioner’s motion to dismiss and anti-SLAPP special
motion to strike is unreported and reproduced at Pet.
App. 45a.
JURISDICTION
The Ninth Circuit issued its opinion on July 31,
1
2013.
The jurisdiction of this Court is properly
invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
PROVISIONS INVOLVED
This case involves the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution, which states that
“Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or
1

The Ninth Circuit applied its rule that a denial of an anti-SLAPP
special motion to strike is reviewable under the collateral order
doctrine. Pet. App. 5a n. 3 (citing Mindys Cosmetics, Inc. v.
Dakar, 611 F.3d 590, 595 (9th Cir. 2010)).
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of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress
of grievances.” U.S. Const. amend I.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case involves the collision of the First
Amendment and the state-law “right-of-publicity” tort,
an issue that has engendered conflict and disarray
among the lower courts. The right of publicity is a
2
modern tort, first recognized in 1953. Generally used
by celebrities, it accords persons an economic right in
their names and likenesses, so they may “profit from
the full commercial value of their identities.”
Cardtoons L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players
Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 968 (10th Cir. 1996).
In recent years, right-of-publicity suits have
proliferated, targeting a variety of speech and
speakers, including musicians who named famous
people in their lyrics; filmmakers who produced movies
documenting the lives of celebrities and historical
figures; authors who wrote “unauthorized biographies”;
magazines and greeting-card manufacturers who used
celebrity images; video-game makers who used
celebrity images in constructing virtual worlds; and
3
artists who depicted celebrities in their artworks.

2

Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d
Cir. 1953).
3

See, e.g., Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437 (6th Cir. 2003)
(OutKast song lyrics); Valentine v. C.B.S., Inc., 698 F.2d 430 (11th
Cir. 1983) (Bob Dylan song lyrics); Seale v. Gramercy Pictures, 949
F. Supp. 331 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (feature movie and book about the
Black Panther Party); Ruffin-Steinback v. dePasse, 82 F. Supp. 2d

3
Courts have struggled to reconcile this new tort
with the protections afforded by the First Amendment.
This Court’s only contribution came nearly forty years
ago in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.,
433 U.S. 562 (1977), in which the Court held that the
First Amendment did not bar a right-of-publicity claim
against a television station that broadcast an
entertainer’s entire human-cannonball act. According
to the Court, broadcasting Zacchini’s entire act posed a
“substantial threat to the economic value of that
performance,” and the Court contrasted the use of a
performer’s “entire act” with the broadcast of a
person’s name or picture in media. Id. at 574-76. Thus,
Zacchini offers little or no guidance in cases involving
mere depictions of individuals, as opposed to
appropriation of their actual performances in full.
Indeed, the Court was careful to cabin its decision:
“[w]herever the line in particular situations is to be
drawn between media reports that are protected and
723 (E.D. Mich. 2000), aff’d, 267 F.3d 457 (6th Cir. 2001) (television
miniseries about the Temptations); Tyne v. Time Warner Entm’t
Co., L.P., 901 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 2005) (movie about a shipwreck);
Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 1994) (book about a
police officer); Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180
(9th Cir. 2001) (magazine using image of Dustin Hoffman); Hilton
v. Hallmark Cards, 599 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2010) (greeting card
using image of Paris Hilton); Kirby v. Sega of Am., Inc., 144 Cal.
App. 4th 47 (2006) (video game); No Doubt v. Activision Publ’g,
Inc., 192 Cal. App. 4th 1018 (2011) (video game); Martin Luther
King, Jr. Ctr. for Soc. Change, Inc. v. Am. Heritage Prods., Inc.,
296 S.E.2d 697 (Ga. 1982) (bust of Martin Luther King, Jr.); ETW
Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003) (lithograph
of Tiger Woods); John Broder, Schwarzenegger Files Suit Against
Bobblehead Maker, N.Y. Times, May 18, 2004, at
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/18/national/18arnold.html.
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those that are not, we are quite sure that the First and
Fourteenth Amendments do not immunize the media
when they broadcast a performer’s entire act without
his consent.” Id. at 574-75.
The expressive work at issue in this case is
Petitioner’s college football video game, which was
alleged to include a realistic depiction of former college
4
football player Respondent Samuel Keller. The Ninth
Circuit (and the Third Circuit, in an essentially
identical case also before this Court on petition for writ
5
of certiorari) held that the First Amendment offered
no defense to Keller’s right-of-publicity claim, because
the game’s depiction of Keller was too realistic and
showed him engaged in the same activity—college
football—in which he had gained his fame.
The Ninth and Third Circuits recognized that
Petitioner’s video game was an expressive work, under
this Court’s holding in Brown v. Entertainment
Merchants Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011). Nonetheless,
they held that the game’s depiction of the plaintiffs did
not enjoy First Amendment protection. According to
the Ninth and Third Circuits, the depiction of a
person’s image or likeness in an expressive work enjoys
First Amendment protection against a right-of4

The consolidated action actually was brought by Keller and eight
other named plaintiffs, some of whom are former college football
players and some of whom are former college basketball players
who allege they were portrayed in Petitioner’s NCAA Basketball
video game. Because they were all identically situated, the Ninth
Circuit treated the case as one brought by Keller and we do so
here as well.

5

Hart v. Elec. Arts Inc., 717 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2013).

5
publicity claim only if the depiction sufficiently alters or
“transforms” the plaintiff’s image or likeness. That rule
is constitutionally perverse:
it affords First
Amendment protection only to fanciful or distorted
portrayals, not accurate or realistic ones. The rule also
chills expression, both because it is hard to predict
what
a
court
will
decide
is
sufficiently
“transformative,” and because such an inquiry
inevitably requires a court to make a subjective
judgment about whether a depiction is “artistic,” thus
warranting protection, or “literal,” and thus subject to
liability.
The test adopted by these two circuits, moreover,
conflicts with various other tests adopted by other
circuits and state supreme courts, which do not focus on
transformation at all. Some of these courts engage in
case-by-case balancing of First Amendment interests
and right-of-publicity interests—an approach that
raises its own constitutional problems. Others give
appropriate respect to the First Amendment by
confining the right-of-publicity tort to circumstances in
which the challenged depiction falsely claims a celebrity
commercial endorsement or is unrelated to any other
expression and thus gratuitous.
The lower courts’ various and conflicting
constitutional tests have resulted in numerous
irreconcilable outcomes.
For example, the Sixth
Circuit has held that the First Amendment protects the
inclusion of a professional golfer’s realistic image,
prominently displayed in a painted montage including
other golfers, ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d
915, 931 (6th Cir. 2003), but the Ninth and Third
Circuits now have held that the First Amendment does

6
not protect an accurate digital depiction of a former
college football player in a video game. As the judicial
confusion has mounted, scholars, writers, and artists
have begun to recognize a major threat to free
6
expression. This Court’s guidance is urgently needed.
A. Factual Background
Petitioner Electronic Arts’ enormously popular
NCAA Football video game series, first unveiled in
1993, artistically creates a fictional interactive college
football gaming experience. In each annual edition of
NCAA Football, users can play individual games or
entire seasons, selecting from unnamed virtual players
from each college’s teams. Pet. App. 3a. The virtual
football games occur in virtual stadiums filled with
virtual fans, coaches, cheerleaders, mascots, and
referees, all meticulously crafted by Electronic Arts’
video game designers. Id. at 4a.

6

See, e.g., Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, What the Right of
Publicity Can Learn from Trademark Law, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 1161
(2006); F. Jay Dougherty, All the World’s Not a Stooge: The
‘Transformativeness’ Test for Analyzing a First Amendment
Defense to a Right of Publicity Claim Against Distribution of a
Work of Art, 27 Colum. J.L. & Arts 1 (2003); Eugene Volokh,
Freedom of Speech and the Right of Publicity, 40 Hous. L. Rev.
903 (2003); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Money as a Thumb on
the Constitutional Scale: Weighing Speech Against Publicity
Rights, 50 B.C. L. Rev. 1503 (2009); Adam Liptak, When it May
Not Pay To be Famous, N.Y. Times, June 1, 2013, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/02/sunday-review/between-thefirst-amendment-and-right-of-publicity.html; Andrea Peterson,
U.S. Court Limits How Art Can Imitate Life, Wash. Post, Aug. 2,
2013, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/theswitch/wp/2013/08/02/us-court-limits-how-art-can-imitate-life/.
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The virtual players (“avatars”) are clothed in their
teams’ uniforms and logos. The unnamed avatars are
identified only by position and jersey number (e.g., QB
#7) but are meant to evoke real players. Thus, for
example, an avatar may have an appearance (e.g.,
height, weight, skin-tone, and throwing arm) and
biographical information (e.g., class year) that match
those of a real player. Id. at 3a-4a.
Within this realistic setting, the game fosters the
user’s creativity and interactivity. Users control the
avatars in invented games and seasons. The game also
includes a mode in which the user “coaches” a college
team for up to thirty seasons to develop a school’s
football program over time. Id. at 4a. Another mode
allows users to control a single virtual player from high
school through college, directing the virtual player’s
choices regarding practices, academics, and social life—
all of which affect the virtual player’s performance in a
game. Id. As Judge Thomas put it in his dissent, “At
its essence, EA’s NCAA Football is a work of
interactive historical fiction.” Id. at 34a.
B. Procedural Background
1. Respondent
Samuel
Keller
played
as
quarterback for Arizona State University in 2005, after
which he transferred to the University of Nebraska,
where he played football during the 2007 season. Id. at
3a. In May 2009, Keller filed this putative class action
lawsuit in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California against Electronic Arts,
the National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”),
and the Collegiate Licensing Company; the district
court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

8
Keller alleged that Petitioner violated his California
statutory and common law right of publicity, among
other claims, and sought hundreds of millions of dollars
in damages on behalf of the putative class and an
injunction prohibiting the use of players’ identities in
the future and mandating the seizure and destruction of
all copies of NCAA Football in Electronic Arts’
possession. C.A. App. 147-48. The district court
granted motions to consolidate Keller’s case with those
of eight other college athletes.
Keller’s right-of-publicity claim was based on the
alleged use of his biographical information and likeness
in the 2005 and 2008 editions of NCAA Football. Pet.
App. 4a-5a. He claimed the game included an animated
avatar of a quarterback wearing Arizona State
University and University of Nebraska uniforms with
his physical and biographical attributes and career
statistics, though not his name or photographic image.
Petitioner moved to dismiss and also filed a special
motion to strike the lawsuit as a strategic lawsuit
against public participation, pursuant to California’s
anti-SLAPP statute. The District Court denied both
motions. Id. at 69a.
2. In July 2013, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
District Court’s denial of Electronic Arts’ anti-SLAPP
motion to strike.
Pet. App. 30a.
The court
acknowledged that, under this Court’s holding in
Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, 131 S. Ct.
2729 (2011), video games are expression that enjoy “the
full protections of the First Amendment.” Pet. App. 2a.
Nevertheless, the court decided that Electronic Arts

9
had no First Amendment defense to Keller’s right-ofpublicity claim. Id. at 30a.
In reaching that conclusion, the Ninth Circuit
adopted a version of the transformative-use test, which
it derived from Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary
Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001). The test it
adopted is essentially identical to the one adopted by
the Third Circuit in Hart v. Electronic Arts Inc., 717
F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2013), the other case currently
pending on a petition for certiorari. That test protects
expression depicting celebrities only if “the work in
question adds significant creative elements so as to be
transformed into something more than a mere celebrity
likeness or imitation.” Pet. App. 8a (quoting Comedy
III, 21 P.3d at 799).
Here, the Ninth Circuit held Electronic Arts’
alleged use of Keller’s likeness “does not qualify for
First Amendment protection as a matter of law
because it literally recreates Keller in the very setting
in which he has achieved renown.” Id. at 3a; see id. at
14a (holding that the video game did not sufficiently
transform Keller’s likeness because it portrayed Keller
“as what he was: the starting quarterback for Arizona
State and Nebraska, and the game’s setting is identical
to where the public found Keller during his collegiate
career: on the football field” (internal quotation marks
and alteration omitted)).
Petitioner argued that the court should adopt the
test announced in Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d
Cir. 1989), contending that this test appropriately
protected First Amendment rights. Under that test,
an expressive work is accorded First Amendment

10
protection against right-of-publicity claims unless the
celebrity’s likeness is unrelated to the work or is used
in a manner that falsely indicates that the celebrity has
endorsed the product. See Pet. App. 21a.
The Ninth Circuit rejected that argument. Id. at
26a. The court reasoned that the Rogers test was
developed to accommodate First Amendment interests
in the context of trademark law, which focuses on the
risk of consumer confusion. Id. at 23a. However, the
court continued, “[t]he right of publicity protects the
celebrity, not the consumer.” Id. (emphasis in original).
Thus, the court concluded, “[t]he reasoning of . . .
Rogers . . . that artistic and literary works should be
protected unless they explicitly mislead consumers[] is
simply not responsive to Keller’s asserted interests
here.” Id. at 24a.
Notably, the same Ninth Circuit panel, in an opinion
released the same day as Keller, held that the First
Amendment provided Electronic Arts with a defense to
a Lanham Act claim brought by a former NFL player
in connection with another of its video games, Madden
NFL Football. See Brown v. Elec. Arts Inc., 724 F.3d
1235, No. 09-56675, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 15647 (9th
Cir. July 31, 2013). Applying the Rogers test, the court
concluded the video game was “entitled to the same
First Amendment protection as great literature, plays,
or books. . . . The Rogers test tells us that, in this case,
the public interest in free expression outweighs the
public interest in avoiding consumer confusion.” Id. at
*32.
Keller cited the decision in Brown, and
acknowledged that Keller would have been “hardpressed” to succeed on his right-of-publicity claim if the

11
court had applied the Rogers test to that claim. Pet.
App. 23a-24a.
Finally, the court rejected two additional defenses,
the public interest exception and the statutory public
7
affairs exception. Id. at 29a.
Judge Thomas forcefully dissented, warning that
the Court had engaged in a “potentially dangerous and
out-of-context interpretation of the transformative use
test.” Id. at 44a (Thomas, J., dissenting). Judge
Thomas noted that he “agree[s] fully with Judge
Ambro’s excellent dissent in Hart,” id. at 34a n.2, and
criticized the majority for “confin[ing] its inquiry to
how a single athlete’s likeness is represented in the
video game, rather than examining the transformative
and creative elements in the video game as a whole[,] . .
. . contradict[ing] the holistic analysis required by the
transformative use test,” id. at 33a. In particular,
Judge Thomas highlighted that
The gamers can . . . change [the virtual players’]
abilities,
appearances,
and
physical
characteristics at will.
Keller’s impressive
physical likeness can be morphed by the gamer
into an overweight and slow virtual athlete, with
anemic passing ability. And the gamer can
create new virtual players out of whole cloth.
Players can change teams. The gamer could pit
Sam Keller against himself, or a stronger or
weaker version of himself, on a different team.
7

California’s right-of-publicity statute exempts from liability uses
“in connection with any news, public affairs, sports broadcast or
account, or any political campaign.” Cal. Civ. Code § 3344(d).

12
Or the gamer could play the game endlessly
without ever encountering Keller’s avatar. In
the simulated games, the gamer controls not
only the conduct of the game, but the weather,
crowd noise, mascots, and other environmental
factors. Of course, one may play the game
leaving the players unaltered, pitting team
against team. But, in this context as well, the
work is one of historic fiction. The gamer
controls the teams, players, and games.
Id. at 35a. Judge Thomas concluded that, “unlike the
majority, [he] would not punish EA for the realism of
its games and for the skill of the artists who created
realistic settings for the football games.” Id. at 37a.
Judge Thomas also emphasized that “the essence of
NCAA Football is founded on publicly available data,
which is not protected by any individual publicity
rights,” id. at 39a, that the players names are not used
in the game, id. at 40a, and that, under the NCAA’s
amateurism rules, “an individual college athlete’s right
of publicity is extraordinarily circumscribed and, in
practical reality, non-existent,” id. at 41a-42a. In
conclusion, Judge Thomas addressed the potential
scope of the majority’s opinion:
The logical consequence of the majority view is
that all realistic depictions of actual persons, no
matter how incidental, are protected by a state
law right of publicity regardless of the creative
context. This logic jeopardizes the creative use
of historic figures in motion pictures, books, and
sound recordings. Absent the use of actual
footage, the motion picture Forrest Gump might
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as well be just a box of chocolates. Without its
historical characters, Midnight in Paris would
be reduced to a pedestrian domestic squabble.
Id. at 43a.
The majority rejected Judge Thomas’ warning that
its opinion jeopardized a broad swath of valuable
expression on the theory that later courts could
examine the “primary motivation” of those who are
likely to purchase (rather than create) the expressive
work. It posited that First Amendment protection
would turn on whether the primary motivation of the
buyer is to acquire the “expressive work of [an] artist”
or to acquire a “reproduction of the celebrity.” Id. at
19a n.10.
On August 21, 2013, the Court of Appeals granted
Electronic Arts’ motion to stay the mandate pending
the outcome of proceedings before this Court. Id. at
72a.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
This Court’s review is urgently needed to resolve
conflicting authority concerning First Amendment
protection against right-of-publicity claims. Since its
8
invention in the second half of the twentieth century,
8

The precise formulation of the tort varies from state to state. See
J. Thomas McCarthy, The Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 6.66.133 (2d ed. 2000) (describing varying state-law formulations).
California has both a statutory and a common law cause of action.
See Pet. App. 5a. Some other states follow the Restatement
(Second) of Torts (1977), which provides that “[o]ne who
appropriates to his own use or benefit the name or likeness of
another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of privacy.”
Id. § 652C. Still other states follow the more narrow formulation
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the right of publicity increasingly has been used in
litigation against creators of expressive works—
including filmmakers, authors, musicians, and others—
whose expression includes the depiction of a real
person. In this case, the Ninth Circuit applied a
transformative-use test that makes First Amendment
protection depend upon whether the depiction distorts
reality enough to be deemed “transformative.” The
more accurate and realistic the depiction, the greater
the likelihood of liability. Other courts use a different
legal test, extending First Amendment protection to
expressive depictions of people regardless of whether
they are realistic or “transformed,” unless those uses
amount to commercial endorsements. Still other courts
engage in case-by-case balancing of First Amendment
interests against the economic interests protected by
the right of publicity.
This disarray and conflict has real-world
consequences: without this Court’s guidance, artists,
musicians, and other content creators will be unsure
what standards apply to their expression and, in
particular, whether the realistic depiction of real
individuals is tortious. If the realistic portrayal of a
of the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition (1995), under
which “[o]ne who appropriates the commercial value of a person’s
identity by using without consent the person’s name, likeness, or
other indicia of identity for purposes of trade is subject to
liability.” See id. § 46 (emphasis added). The phrase “for purposes
of trade” means “used in advertising the user’s goods or services,
or . . . placed on merchandise marketed by the user,” and “does not
ordinarily include the use of a person’s identity in news reporting,
commentary, entertainment, works of fiction or nonfiction, or in
advertising that is incidental to such uses.” Id. § 47.
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person in an expressive work can strip the work of
First Amendment protection, then countless creative
works are at risk of suit, including films like The Social
Network, 42, A Beautiful Mind, and All the President’s
Men; documentaries like Ken Burns’ Baseball and Jazz;
works of historical fiction like E.L. Doctorow’s Ragtime
and Thomas Pynchon’s Gravity’s Rainbow; and
“unauthorized biographies” like those by Kitty Kelley.
All of these works realistically portray actual
individuals in the contexts that made them famous and
use their biographical details. The effect of this
uncertainty is to chill protected expression, all in the
name of a tort with questionable underlying purposes.
This Court should grant review to resolve the conflicts
and provide clear direction.
I.

The Lower Courts Are In Disarray
Concerning the First Amendment Limits on
Right-of-Publicity Claims.
A. The
Ninth
and
Third
Circuits’
Transformative-Use
Test
Protects
an
Expressive Work Only if the Plaintiff’s
Likeness Is “Transformed.”

This case is the first time the Ninth Circuit has held
that the First Amendment protects the use of a
person’s image or likeness in expressive speech only if
9
the image or likeness is sufficiently “transformed,” and
does not protect “realistic[] portray[als].” Pet. App.
9

The Ninth Circuit previously applied the transformative-use test
as a state-law defense in Hilton v. Hallmark Cards, 599 F.3d 894
(9th Cir. 2010), but it did not decide in that case whether the
transformative-use test defines the scope of First Amendment
protection. See id. at 909 n.11.
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19a. In so holding, the Ninth Circuit followed the Third
Circuit’s formulation of the transformative-use test in
Hart, 717 F.3d at 165.
The transformative-use test was first articulated in
2001, when the California Supreme Court addressed a
right-of-publicity claim based on a charcoal drawing of
The Three Stooges. Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 799. That
court borrowed from copyright fair-use doctrine and
adopted what it described as “essentially a balancing
test . . . based on whether the work in question adds
significant creative elements so as to be transformed
into something more than a mere celebrity likeness or
imitation.” Id. Applying that test to the facts at hand,
the court found the Three Stooges drawing, sold as a
lithograph and on t-shirts, to be insufficiently
transformative. Id. at 811. It explained that the
artist’s “undeniable skill is manifestly subordinated to
the overall goal of creating literal, conventional
depictions of The Three Stooges so as to exploit their
fame.” Id.
In so holding, the California Supreme Court
distinguished the drawing at issue from Andy Warhol’s
portraits of celebrities such as Marilyn Monroe,
Elizabeth Taylor, and Elvis Presley. It explained:
“Through distortion and the careful manipulation of
context, Warhol was able to convey a message that
went beyond the commercial exploitation of celebrity
images and became a form of ironic social comment on
the dehumanization of celebrity itself.”
Id.
Underscoring the unpredictability of its test, the court
acknowledged that the difference between works that
enjoy constitutional protections (like Warhol’s
depictions of Marilyn Monroe) and those that do not

17
(like the Three Stooges sketch) will “sometimes be
10
subtle.” Id.
B. The Constitutional Test Adopted Below Is
Inconsistent With Tests Applied By Other
Courts.
Other circuits and state supreme courts have
adopted a different constitutional approach, applying
different First Amendment tests that do not depend on
a depiction’s transformative character—albeit tests
that themselves conflict with one another.

1. Four Circuits and Two State Supreme
Courts Have Held that the First Amendment
Protects Non-Commercial Speech Depicting
Well-Known People, Even if the Depiction Is
Not “Transformed.”

The Second, Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits,
along with the Florida and Kentucky Supreme Courts,
all have held that the First Amendment protects the
depiction of an individual within an expressive work,
unless the depiction amounts to an unauthorized
commercial endorsement or is unrelated to any other
expression and thus gratuitous.
In Rogers, the Second Circuit considered a federal
Lanham Act claim and a state right-of-publicity claim
brought by Ginger Rogers against the makers of a
Federico Fellini film entitled “Ginger and Fred”—a
10

See Aaron Moss, When It Comes to the Right of Publicity, Yes,
Doubt
(February
18,
2011)
http://www.lawlawlandblog.com/2011/02/when_it_comes_to_the_ri
ght_of.html (displaying the Marilyn Monroe painting and the
Three Stooges sketch side by side).
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film not about Ginger Rogers and Fred Astaire, but
instead about a fictional Italian duo who imitated them,
becoming known in Italy as “Ginger and Fred.” 875
F.2d at 996-97. The Second Circuit ruled in favor of the
filmmaker, holding first that the First Amendment
protects the use of a person’s name in a film title from a
Lanham Act claim unless the use was “‘wholly
unrelated’ to the movie or was ‘simply a disguised
commercial advertisement for the sale of goods or
services.’” Id. at 1004; see id. at 998-1000. The court
then applied essentially the same standard in rejecting
Rogers’ right-of-publicity claim under Oregon law. Id.
at 1004-05.
Other courts have applied the Rogers standard or a
similar test in describing the First Amendment limits
to right-of-publicity claims. For example, in Matthews
v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432, 440 (5th Cir. 1994), the Fifth
Circuit cited Rogers in concluding that the First
Amendment barred a right-of-publicity claim based on
a fictionalized, but accurate, account of an undercover
police officer’s experiences. Similarly, in Parks v.
LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 461 (6th Cir. 2003), the
Sixth Circuit adopted Rogers and remanded for a
factual determination concerning whether the use of
the plaintiff’s name in a song title was a “disguised
commercial advertisement” that would remove it from
11
First Amendment protection.
And in Valentine v.
11

Shortly after Parks, the Sixth Circuit decided ETW, which
involved a right-of-publicity claim challenging an artist’s use of
Tiger Woods’ image in a painting celebrating Woods’ golfing
achievements. 322 F.3d at 918-19. The Ninth Circuit below stated
that, in view of ETW, the Sixth Circuit had been “inconsistent[]” in
its use of the Rogers test for right-of-publicity claims. Pet. App.
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C.B.S., Inc., 698 F.2d 430 (11th Cir. 1983), the Eleventh
Circuit construed the Florida right-of-publicity statute
to allow the use of a person’s name except “to directly
promote a product or service,” in order to avoid “grave
questions” about the constitutionality of any broader
interpretation. Id. at 433.
The Kentucky Supreme Court also has adopted this
constitutional line, holding that a right-of-publicity
claim may proceed only if the “use of a person’s name or
likeness or other interest[s]” “is not sufficiently related
to the underlying work, or, if the otherwise
constitutionally-protected work is simply disguised
commercial advertisement for the sale of goods or
services.” Montgomery v. Montgomery, 60 S.W.3d 524,
529 (Ky. 2001) (footnote omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted). And the Florida Supreme Court
recently adopted a similar rule, stating that, in light of
First Amendment constraints, the state’s right of
publicity does not bar the use of a name or likeness
except to “directly promote a product or service.”
Tyne v. Time Warner Entm’t Co. L.P., 901 So. 2d 802,
810 (Fla. 2005); see also Bullard v. MRA Holding, LLC,
740 S.E.2d 622, 627 (Ga. 2013) (holding that the use of
the plaintiff’s image on the cover of a College Girls
Gone Wild video was actionable under Georgia’s right
of publicity, and did not violate the defendant’s
25a. In fact, ETW confirmed that, in Parks, the Sixth Circuit had
“applied the Rogers test to . . . right-of-publicity claims,” ETW, 332
F.3d at 936 n.17. After applying that test to the facts before it,
ETW went on to analyze the case under a case-specific balancing of
interests, id. at 937-38 (citing Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League
Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959 (10th Cir. 1996)), and the
transformative-use test, id. at 938, as well.
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“freedoms of speech and press” because the image was
used “as a part of an advertisement”) (quotation marks
omitted).
The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition
encourages the adoption of this test as well, explaining
that the right of publicity is “fundamentally constrained
by the public and constitutional interest in freedom of
expression,” and the First Amendment ought to
provide a defense against a right-of-publicity claim
unless “the name or likeness is used solely to attract
attention to a work that is not related to the identified
person.” Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition, §
47 cmt. c (1995).

2. Other

Courts
Balancing.

Engage

in

Case-Specific

Still other courts engage in various forms of
balancing, weighing the expressive interests protected
by the First Amendment against the economic
interests protected by the right of publicity based on
the particular facts of the case before them. In so
doing, none of these courts has focused on whether a
likeness has been sufficiently “transformed.”
Thus, in C.B.C. Distribution & Marketing., Inc. v.
Major League Baseball Advanced Media, LP, 505 F.3d
818 (8th Cir. 2007), the Eighth Circuit held that the
First Amendment protected fantasy baseball products
that used the names of real players, their biographical
data, and their performance statistics. In reaching that
conclusion, the court emphasized “the public value of
information about the game of baseball and its players,”
noted that “the information used in CBC’s fantasy
baseball games is all readily available in the public
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domain,” and reasoned that “it would be strange law
that a person would not have a [F]irst [A]mendment
right to use information that is available to everyone.”
Id. at 823. By contrast, it continued, “the facts in this
case barely, if at all implicate the interests that states
typically intend to vindicate by providing rights of
publicity to individuals.” Id. at 824. Specifically, the
court reasoned that publicity rights to one’s name and
performance statistics were not needed to encourage
baseball players to play the sport, and that there was
little risk of consumer confusion, because the
defendant’s game included all players. Id.
The Ninth Circuit below attempted to harmonize its
outcome with C.B.C. on the ground that C.B.C. did not
involve the “use[] [of] virtual likenesses of actual
college football players,” Pet. App. 29a-30a n.12, but
instead “merely incorporated the names along with
performance and biographical data of actual major
league baseball players.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). That distinction is not persuasive: if the
First Amendment protects the use of someone’s name
and publicly available performance and biographical
data, then it also protects the creation of an avatar
reflecting publicly available information about a
player’s appearance and playing style. Indeed, the
Eighth Circuit itself made clear that C.B.C.’s
expressive interests would have been no different had
it used actual photos of the players, see 505 F.3d at 823;
nor would the use of photos have changed the court’s
balancing of interests.
The Tenth Circuit in Cardtoons likewise applied a
case-specific balancing test to reject a right-of-publicity
claim against the creator of parody baseball cards
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featuring recognizable caricatures of real baseball
players. 955 F.3d at 962-63. The court held that the
trading cards were expressive speech “subject to full
First Amendment protection,” id. at 970, and
emphasized that “[c]elebrities . . . are an important
element of the shared communicative resources of our
cultural domain,” and that “[r]estricting the use of
celebrity identities restricts the communication of
ideas,” id. at 972. It further held that these interests
outweighed any purported justification for the right of
publicity. See id. at 973-76.
In Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363 (Mo.
2003), the Missouri Supreme Court took a markedly
different approach, holding that speech receives First
Amendment protection against a right-of-publicity
claim only if its “predominant purpose . . . is to make an
expressive comment on or about a celebrity.” Id. at 374
(quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). If, on the
other hand, the speech “predominantly exploits the
commercial value of an individual’s identity,” it is
subject to liability under the right of publicity, “even if
there is some ‘expressive’ content in it.” Id. (quotation
marks omitted). In devising that test, the court
12
specifically rejected the transformative-use test. Id.

12

Other courts, applying state common law or statutory exceptions
designed to accommodate constitutional concerns, have drawn the
line between protected and unprotected celebrity depictions by
focusing on whether the publication is “newsworthy” or in the
“public interest.” See, e.g., Toffoloni v. LFP Publ’g Group, LLC,
572 F.3d 1201, 1208 (11th Cir. 2009) (applying Georgia law);
Montana v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc., 34 Cal. App. 4th 790,
793-94 (1995) (applying California law).
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II.

This Case Presents an Ideal Vehicle For
Addressing the Constitutional Question.

Plainly, the lower courts need guidance from this
Court delineating the scope of First Amendment
protection against a right-of-publicity claim. This case
presents an excellent vehicle for providing such
guidance. The Ninth Circuit acknowledged the wideranging circuit conflict on the issue—see Pet. App. 24a26a (noting that the Second and Sixth Circuits have
applied the Rogers test to right-of-publicity claims and
that the Tenth and Eighth Circuits had applied “a
flexible case-by-case approach”).
And it also
recognized that its decision to apply the
transformative-use test, as opposed to the more
speech-protective Rogers test, was outcomedeterminative. The court acknowledged that Keller
“would be hard-pressed to support” a claim under the
Rogers test “absent evidence that EA explicitly misled
consumers” into “believing that he is endorsing EA or
its products.” Pet. App. 23a.
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Brown—issued by
the same panel on the same day—confirmed that the
court’s decision to apply the transformative-use test to
right-of-publicity claims, rather than the Rogers test,
determined the outcome in this case. Brown concerned
a Lanham Act claim brought by a former NFL player
complaining about the use of his likeness in Petitioner’s
Madden NFL game. See Brown 724 F.3d at __, 2013
U.S. App. LEXIS 15647, at *3. The court applied the
Rogers test and concluded that the First Amendment
barred the Lanham Act claim, because “Brown’s
likeness is artistically relevant to the games and there
are no alleged facts to support the claim that
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[Electronic Arts] explicitly misled consumers as to
Brown’s involvement with the games.” Id. at *32. In
such circumstances, the court held, “the public interest
in free expression outweighs the public interest in
avoiding consumer confusion.” Id. Had the court
applied that same test to the right-of-publicity claim in
Keller, Electronic Arts would have prevailed, just as it
did in Brown.
III.

The Ninth Circuit’s Holding Is Wrong and
Conflicts with This Court’s First Amendment
Jurisprudence.

This Court’s review also is warranted because the
Ninth Circuit’s decision—which allows a state to
impose tort liability for non-commercial expression that
portrays a person realistically—is both wrong and
dangerous. The decision cannot be squared with this
Court’s precedents, and it threatens to chill the
exercise of First Amendment rights.
A. The Adopted Transformative-Use Test Does
Not Adequately Respect First Amendment
Rights.
The Ninth and Third Circuits’ transformative-use
test does not properly limit the right of publicity so
that it becomes consistent with the First Amendment.
The right of publicity penalizes fully protected and
valuable speech based on its content:
the tort
proscribes expression because it includes another’s
name or likeness within its content. Bartnicki v.
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Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 521 (2001).
This Court
repeatedly has held, however, that “[c]ontent-based
regulations” of speech “are presumptively invalid” and
must be subjected to strict constitutional scrutiny.
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992);
accord, e.g., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002)
(“[A]s a general matter . . . government has no power to
restrict expression because of . . . its content.”)
(quotation marks omitted; bracket in original); Regan v.
Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 648 (1984) (holding
unconstitutional a statute prohibiting accurate
depictions of U.S. currency unless for educational,
historic, or newsworthy purposes because those
determinations “cannot help but be based on the
content of the photograph and the message it
delivers”).
The limited exceptions to this rule consist of a few
“historic and traditional categories” of expression,
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468-69 (2010)
(quotation marks omitted), which are “of such slight
social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may
be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the
social interest in order and morality.” R.A.V., 505 U.S.
at 383 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568, 572 (1942)).
These include obscenity,
defamation, fraud, fighting words, true threats, and
speech integral to criminal conduct, see United States v.
Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544 (2012) (collecting cases),
and “represent ‘well-defined and narrowly limited
13

See also Volokh, supra note 6 at 912 n.35 (2003) (“The right of
publicity is clearly content-based: It prohibits the unlicensed use
of particular content (people’s name or likenesses).”).
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classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of
which have never been thought to raise any
Constitutional problem,” Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2733
(quoting Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72). This Court
repeatedly has refused to expand these well-defined
and historical categories or to add new categories of
speech that the government may proscribe. See, e.g.,
Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2544; Stevens, 559 U.S. at 482;
Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2741.
An expressive work does not fall into any of these
traditional exceptions merely because it includes a
portrayal of an actual person. To the contrary, the
right-of-publicity tort penalizing such speech is a
modern innovation, not recognized in California itself
until 1979. See Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d
425 (Cal. 1979). As a leading commentator has put it,
the right of publicity is “still a relatively raw and brash
newcomer,” 1 J. Thomas McCarthy, The Rights of
Publicity and Privacy (2d ed. 2000).
Because the right of publicity penalizes speech
based on its content and does not fall into one of the
recognized exceptions to full First Amendment
protection, it is invalid, unless its application can be
limited so as to avoid unconstitutional applications of
the tort. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2738 (“It is rare that a
regulation restricting speech because of its content will
ever be permissible.” (quoting United States v. Playboy
Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 818 (2000)); id.
(explaining that content-based regulations of speech
are impermissible unless they can survive strict
scrutiny). The transformative-use test applied here
does not do that.
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To the contrary, a test that protects fanciful
depictions of a person but imposes liability for realistic
depictions cannot be a suitable First Amendment
standard. Realistic depictions within expressive works
do not constitute a category of speech, like defamation
or obscenity, that warrants anything less than full First
Amendment
protection
against
content-based
restrictions. Indeed, many valuable works, including
biographies, documentaries, and historical fiction,
include realistic portrayals or references to real people.
A transformative-use test also does not sufficiently
limit the right of publicity to circumstances where its
application can survive strict scrutiny. There is no
compelling state interest in stamping out realistic
portrayals of people. According to the Ninth Circuit,
the right of publicity serves to “‘protect[] a form of
intellectual property [in one’s person] that society
deems to have some social utility.’” Pet. App. 23a
(quoting Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 804) (second alteration
in original); id. at 24a (“Keller’s claim is that EA has
appropriated, without permission and without
providing compensation, his talent and years of hard
work on the football field.”). That economic interest,
however, is not sufficiently compelling to justify
14
penalizing non-commercial expression.
Furthermore,
a
person’s
appearance
and
biography—here, for example, Keller’s height, weight,
14

Many question the validity of the justifications for the right of
publicity altogether. See, e.g., Dogan & Lemley, supra note 6, at
1188; Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image:
Popular Culture & Publicity Rights, 81 Cal. L. Rev. 127, 238
(1993); Volokh, supra note 6, at 911.
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throwing arm, and visor—are facts in the public
domain. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged as
much. See Pet. App. 30a n.12 (“It is seemingly true that
each likeness is generated largely from publicly
available data . . . .”). It concluded, however, that the
First Amendment should not protect the use of publicly
available data to create a realistic likeness because the
right of publicity would otherwise be “neuter[ed] . . . in
our digital world.” Pet. App. 30a n.12. The court
stated: “If EA creates a virtual likeness of Tom Brady
using only publicly available data . . . does EA have free
reign to use that likeness in commercials without
violating Brady’s right of publicity? We think not, and
thus must reject [the] point about the public
availability of much of the data used . . . .” Id.
But no one claims that one may use publicly
available data to insert a celebrity image in a
commercial. That is precisely what the Rogers test
addresses by withholding First Amendment protection
from false claims of celebrity endorsement.
The
question here is whether a speaker may use publicly
available data to create a likeness for use in noncommercial expression. The Ninth Circuit offers no
reason why the First Amendment should not protect
such use. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964); C.B.C., 505 F.3d at 823 (“[T]he information used
in CBC’s fantasy baseball games is all readily available
in the public domain, and it would be strange law that a
person would not have a [F]irst [A]mendment right to
use information that is available to everyone.”).
Indeed, the transformative-use test as applied here
is particularly perverse, because it assumes that the
state has a stronger interest in penalizing accurate
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speech than in penalizing speech that is
“transformative.” That has things backwards: this
Court has repeatedly held that truthful and accurate
expression warrants maximum First Amendment
protection. Cf. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485
U.S. 46, 52 (1988) (“False statements of fact are
particularly valueless; they interfere with the truthseeking function of the marketplace of ideas, and they
cause damage to an individual’s reputation that cannot
easily be repaired by counterspeech, however
persuasive or effective.”); The Florida Star v. B.J.F.,
491 U.S. 524, 534 (1989) (criticizing a Florida law
making it unlawful to publicize the name of the victim
of a sexual offense because it “punish[ed] truthful
publication”); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967)
(prohibiting false light liability even for false speech on
“matters of public interest in the absence of proof that
the defendant published the report with knowledge of
its falsity or in reckless disregard of the truth”).
B. The Transformative-Use Test Will Chill
Protected Speech Because It Is Overbroad
and Unpredictable.
The Ninth Circuit’s decision is not only wrong but
also dangerous. Its transformative-use test is too
vague and unpredictable, and too susceptible to a
court’s subjective artistic judgments, to be a workable
First Amendment standard.
This Court repeatedly has emphasized the
importance of ensuring that restrictions on the content
of speech are “well-defined.” Stevens, 559 U.S. at 468.
Predictability is important because speakers otherwise
will “‘steer far wider of the unlawful zone’ . . . than if
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the boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly
marked,” Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964)
(quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958)),
thereby causing an “obvious chilling effect on free
speech,” Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 871-72 (1997).
The Ninth Circuit’s transformative-use test fails
these requirements.
If taken literally, the
transformative-use test would allow states to subject
biographers, filmmakers, singers, photographers, and
other artists to tort liability whenever they include
realistic images of, or references to, famous people.
Yet many expressive works routinely use a real
person’s actual name or likeness, including, for
example, films like The Social Network, Moneyball, 42,
and The King’s Speech; documentaries like Ken Burns’
critically acclaimed series on the history of baseball;
and best-selling biographies, like those by Kitty Kelley.
Indeed, a key element of the artistry in these works
is the realism or accuracy of the portrayal. For
example, the genius of Daniel Day-Lewis’ portrayal of
Abraham Lincoln was his ability to imitate, with great
realism, the likeness, mannerisms, and attributes of the
president doing what Lincoln actually did. It would be
disturbing if the artistic success of such a portrayal
were precisely what would make it actionable. Cf.
Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1359
(D.N.J. 1981) (rejecting Elvis impersonator’s First
Amendment defense to a right-of-publicity claim
brought by Presley’s estate; “entertainment that is
merely a copy or imitation, even if skillfully and
accurately carried out, does not really have its own
creative component and does not have a significant
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value as pure entertainment” (cited with approval by
the Third Circuit in Hart, 717 F.3d at 164)).
To avoid absurd and dangerous outcomes, courts
applying the transformative-use test will have little
choice but to draw distinctions among expressive works
reflecting their own subjective judgments about
whether a particular work is sufficiently “artistic” or
“creative” that it warrants protection.
Thus, the
California Supreme Court in Comedy III determined
that a sketch of The Three Stooges was not creative
enough to receive First Amendment protection, but an
Andy Warhol portrait of Marilyn Monroe did deserve
such protection because it presented “a form of ironic
social comment on the dehumanization of celebrity
itself.” 21 P.3d at 811. Courts should not place
themselves in the role of art critic and make First
Amendment freedoms turn on subjective judgments of
this kind. Cf. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing
Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) (Holmes, J.) (“It would be
a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to
the law to constitute themselves final judges of the
worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest
and most obvious limits.”).
A legal regime turning on such “subtle” distinctions
among expressive works, Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 812, is
inherently unpredictable and will chill expression.
Hart presents a good example of such unpredictability.
The Third Circuit concluded that an avatar portraying
a college football player in an animated and interactive
fictional college football game was actionable because
the player’s image was not sufficiently transformed;
yet, in the same decision, the court held that placement,
in a later edition of the same video game, of an actual
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photograph of the player in a montage of other
photographs of Rutgers football players was not
actionable, because the context made the depiction
transformative. Hart, 717 F.3d at 169-70 (citing ETW,
332 F.3d at 938).
15

It is hard rationally to reconcile these two rulings.
According to the dissent in Hart, the majority simply
treated video games as less worthy of constitutional
protection than other types of expressive works, such
as photomontages—despite this Court’s clear
preclusion of such a First Amendment double standard
in Brown.
Id. at 174 (Ambro, J., dissenting)
(expressing concern about “a medium-specific metric
that provides less protection to video games than other
expressive works”). The majority did not respond to
Judge Ambro’s concerns at all, except to claim that it
faithfully followed Brown’s admonition that video
games “enjoy the full force of First Amendment
protections.” Id. at 148 (majority opinion).
Similarly, Judge Thomas warned that the Ninth
Circuit’s holding “jeopardizes the creative use of
15

The Ninth Circuit’s applications of the transformative-use test
prior to the case also demonstrate the test’s unpredictability. In
Hilton, the court held that the use of Paris Hilton’s face superimposed over a cartoon body in a greeting card parody of the
television show The Simple Life was not transformative because
“the basic setting is the same [as in the show]: we see Paris Hilton,
born to privilege, working as a waitress.” 599 F.3d at 911. Yet in
Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2001),
the Ninth Circuit stated in dicta that a magazine’s use of an image
of Dustin Hoffman from “Tootsie” was transformative because
“Hoffman’s body was eliminated and a new, differently clothed
body was substituted in its place.” Id. at 1184 n.2.
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historic figures in motion pictures, books, and sound
recordings.” Pet. App. 43a (Thomas, J., dissenting).
The majority responded that its holding was not so
broad, because its transformative-use test allows a
court to consider “whether a likely purchaser’s primary
motivation is to buy a reproduction of the celebrity, or
to buy the expressive work of that artist. Certainly
this leaves room for distinguishing this case . . . and
cases involving other kinds of expressive works.” Id. at
19a-20a n.10 (majority opinion) (internal quotation
marks omitted; citations omitted) (emphasis added).
This reasoning bears no relation to this Court’s First
Amendment jurisprudence. First, it implies the type of
medium-specific metric this Court rejected in Brown,
131 S. Ct. at 2733. Second, it requires speakers to guess
what a court might guess to be “a likely purchaser’s
primary motivation,” Pet. App. 19a n.10, in buying an
expressive work. Such a standard might “leave[] room
for [courts to] distinguish[]” cases, id. at 20a n.10, but it
leaves no “breathing room for protected speech,”
Illinois ex. rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., Inc.,
538 U.S. 600, 620 (2003). Speakers’ potential liability
cannot possibly depend upon whether they guess
correctly about the motivations of people they do not
know and cannot control.
Speakers need certainty about whether their speech
will subject them to liability, or they will self-censor.
The transformative-use test cannot provide that
predictability.
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C. Case-Specific
Problematic.

Balancing

Is

Equally

Decisions calling for ad hoc balancing of First
Amendment interests and the interests protected by
the right of publicity present just as many
constitutional problems. See, e.g., Cardtoons, 95 F.3d
at 973-76; C.B.C., 505 F.3d at 824. This Court has
rejected any notion of a “free-floating test for First
Amendment coverage.” Stevens, 559 U.S. at 470; see
also Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2734. As this Court has
explained, “[t]he First Amendment's guarantee of free
speech does not extend only to categories of speech
that survive an ad hoc balancing of relative social costs
and benefits. The First Amendment itself reflects a
judgment by the American people that the benefits of
its restrictions on the Government outweigh the costs.
Our Constitution forecloses any attempt to revise that
judgment simply on the basis that some speech is not
worth it.” Stevens, 559 U.S. at 470.
Moreover, here, ad hoc balancing requires a court to
weigh apples against oranges. There is no principled
way to determine, case by case, whether the economic
interest of a person in preventing a given portrayal
outweighs the social value of a given expressive work.
The two interests being compared are too different to
enable judges to reach consistent and predictable
results.
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D. The Rogers Test Confines the Right of
Publicity to Circumstances Where Its
Application Does Not Violate the First
Amendment.
Unlike the transformative-use test and case-by-case
balancing, the Rogers test confines the right-ofpublicity tort to situations in which speakers have used
a depiction of, or reference to, a celebrity to sell
something—either by falsely claiming a celebrity
commercial endorsement or by including a celebrity
image in a publication gratuitously, just to attract
attention.
Confined to these circumstances, the right of
publicity does not raise constitutional concerns. Speech
that falsely claims a commercial endorsement is akin to
the category of fraudulent speech that the government
has long regulated without any First Amendment
concerns. See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va.
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771
(1976) (noting that fraudulent speech generally falls
outside the protections of the First Amendment). And
the gratuitous use of a celebrity’s image to attract
attention, unrelated to any expressive content in the
work, likewise falls outside First Amendment
protection altogether. Thus confined, the right-ofpublicity tort raises little constitutional concern.
*

*

*

This Court’s review is sorely needed. Because so
many expressive works are distributed nationwide, the
rule created by the Ninth and Third Circuits effectively
has set the constitutional rule for the rest of the
country. But that rule makes no sense constitutionally.
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Moreover, the rule is so vague and unpredictable in its
application that speakers will not know whether their
speech is constitutionally protected or tortious. Given
the potentially ruinous financial consequences of
guessing wrong (here, Respondent seeks hundreds of
millions of dollars on behalf of a class that could have
thousands of members), speakers will go too far in their
self-censorship. Unless and until this Court intervenes,
a great deal of valuable and protected expression will
be chilled.
CONCLUSION
This Court should grant the petition for a writ of
certiorari.
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The NCAA’s motion to file its amicus brief is GRANTED.
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Before: SIDNEY R. THOMAS and JAY S. BYBEE,
Circuit Judges, and GORDON J. QUIST, Senior District Judge.**
OPINION
BYBEE, Circuit Judge:
Video games are entitled to the full protections of
the First Amendment, because “[l]ike the protected
books, plays, and movies that preceded them, video
games
communicate
ideas—and
even
social
messages—through many familiar literary devices
(such as characters, dialogue, plot, and music) and
through features distinctive to the medium (such as the
player’s interaction with the virtual world).” Brown v.
Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, ––– U.S. ––––, ––––, 131 S. Ct.
2729, 2733, 180 L. Ed. 2d 708 (2011).1 Such rights are
not absolute, and states may recognize the right of
publicity to a degree consistent with the First
**

The Honorable Gordon J. Quist, Senior District Judge for the
U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan, sitting by
designation.

1

In Brown v. Electronic Arts, Inc., No. 09–56675, slip op. at 9–10
(9th Cir. July 31, 2013), we noted that “there may be some work
referred to as a ‘video game’ (or referred to as a ‘book,’ ‘play,’ or
‘movie’ for that matter) that does not contain enough of the
elements contemplated by the Supreme Court [in Brown v.
Entertainment Merchants Association] to warrant First
Amendment protection as an expressive work,” but asserted that
“[e]ven if there is a line to be drawn between expressive video
games and non-expressive video games, and even if courts should
at some point be drawing that line, we have no need to draw that
line here.” The same holds true in this case.
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Amendment. Zacchini v. Scripps–Howard Broad. Co.,
433 U.S. 562, 574–75, 97 S. Ct. 2849, 53 L. Ed. 2d 965
(1977). In this case, we must balance the right of
publicity of a former college football player against the
asserted First Amendment right of a video game
developer to use his likeness in its expressive works.
The district court concluded that the game
developer, Electronic Arts (“EA”), had no First
Amendment defense against the right-of-publicity
claims of the football player, Samuel Keller. We affirm.
Under the “transformative use” test developed by the
California Supreme Court, EA’s use does not qualify
for First Amendment protection as a matter of law
because it literally recreates Keller in the very setting
in which he has achieved renown. The other First
Amendment defenses asserted by EA do not defeat
Keller’s claims either.
I
Samuel Keller was the starting quarterback for
Arizona State University in 2005 before he transferred
to the University of Nebraska, where he played during
the 2007 season. EA is the producer of the NCAA
Football series of video games, which allow users to
control avatars representing college football players as
those avatars participate in simulated games. In NCAA
Football, EA seeks to replicate each school’s entire
team as accurately as possible. Every real football
player on each team included in the game has a
corresponding avatar in the game with the player’s
actual jersey number and virtually identical height,
weight, build, skin tone, hair color, and home state. EA
attempts to match any unique, highly identifiable
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playing behaviors by sending detailed questionnaires to
team equipment managers. Additionally, EA creates
realistic virtual versions of actual stadiums; populates
them with the virtual athletes, coaches, cheerleaders,
and fans realistically rendered by EA’s graphic artists;
and incorporates realistic sounds such as the crunch of
the players’ pads and the roar of the crowd.
EA’s game differs from reality in that EA omits the
players’ names on their jerseys and assigns each player
a home town that is different from the actual player’s
home town. However, users of the video game may
upload rosters of names obtained from third parties so
that the names do appear on the jerseys. In such cases,
EA allows images from the game containing athletes’
real names to be posted on its website by users. Users
can further alter reality by entering “Dynasty” mode,
where the user assumes a head coach’s responsibilities
for a college program for up to thirty seasons, including
recruiting players from a randomly generated pool of
high school athletes, or “Campus Legend” mode, where
the user controls a virtual player from high school
through college, making choices relating to practices,
academics, and social life.
In the 2005 edition of the game, the virtual starting
quarterback for Arizona State wears number 9, as did
Keller, and has the same height, weight, skin tone, hair
color, hair style, handedness, home state, play style
(pocket passer), visor preference, facial features, and
school year as Keller. In the 2008 edition, the virtual
quarterback for Nebraska has these same
characteristics, though the jersey number does not
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match, presumably because Keller changed his number
right before the season started.
Objecting to this use of his likeness, Keller filed a
putative class-action complaint in the Northern District
of California asserting, as relevant on appeal, that EA
violated his right of publicity under California Civil
Code § 3344 and California common law.2 EA moved to
strike the complaint as a strategic lawsuit against
public participation (“SLAPP”) under California’s
anti-SLAPP statute, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16, and
the district court denied the motion. We have
jurisdiction over EA’s appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1291. See Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1024–26 (9th
Cir. 2003). 3
II
California’s anti-SLAPP statute is designed to
discourage suits that “masquerade as ordinary lawsuits
but are brought to deter common citizens from
2

There are actually nine named plaintiffs, all former National
Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”) football or basketball
players: Keller, Edward O’Bannon, Jr. (UCLA), Byron Bishop
(University of North Carolina), Michael Anderson (University of
Memphis), Danny Wimprine (University of Memphis), Ishmael
Thrower (Arizona State University), Craig Newsome (Arizona
State University), Damien Rhodes (Syracuse University), and
Samuel Jacobson (University of Minnesota). EA’s NCAA
basketball games are also implicated in this appeal. Because the
issues are the same for each plaintiff, all of the claims are
addressed through our discussion of Keller and NCAA Football.
3 We review de novo the district court’s denial of a motion to strike
under California’s anti-SLAPP statute. Mindys Cosmetics, Inc. v.
Dakar, 611 F.3d 590, 595 (9th Cir. 2010).
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exercising their political or legal rights or to punish
them for doing so.” Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1024 (internal
quotation marks omitted). The statute provides:
A cause of action against a person arising from
any act of that person in furtherance of the
person’s right of petition or free speech under
the United States Constitution or the California
Constitution in connection with a public issue
shall be subject to a special motion to strike,
unless the court determines that the plaintiff has
established that there is a probability that the
plaintiff will prevail on the claim.
Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(b)(1). We have
determined that the anti-SLAPP statute is available in
federal court. Thomas v. Fry’s Elecs., Inc., 400 F.3d
1206 (9th Cir. 2005) (per curiam).
We evaluate an anti-SLAPP motion in two steps.
First, the defendant must “make a prima facie showing
that the plaintiff’s suit arises from an act by the
defendant made in connection with a public issue in
furtherance of the defendant’s right to free speech
under the United States or California Constitution.”
Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1024. Keller does not contest that
EA has made this threshold showing. Indeed, there is
no question that “video games qualify for First
Amendment protection,” Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S.
Ct. at 2733, or that Keller’s suit arises from EA’s
production and distribution of NCAA Football in
furtherance of EA’s protected right to express itself
through video games.
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Second, we must evaluate whether the plaintiff has
“establish[ed] a reasonable probability that the plaintiff
will prevail on his or her . . . claim.” Batzel, 333 F.3d at
1024. “The plaintiff must demonstrate that the
complaint is legally sufficient and supported by a prima
facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if
the evidence submitted by plaintiff is credited.”
Metabolife Int’l, Inc. v. Wornick, 264 F.3d 832, 840 (9th
Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). The
statute “subjects to potential dismissal only those
actions in which the plaintiff cannot state and
substantiate a legally sufficient claim.” Navellier v.
Sletten, 29 Cal.4th 82, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 530, 52 P.3d 703,
711 (Cal. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). EA
did not contest before the district court and does not
contest here that Keller has stated a right-of-publicity
claim under California common and statutory law. 4
Instead, EA raises four affirmative defenses derived
from the First Amendment: the “transformative use”
test, the Rogers test, the “public interest” test, and the
“public affairs” exemption. EA argues that, in light of
these defenses, it is not reasonably probable that Keller
4

The elements of a right-of-publicity claim under California
common law are: “(1) the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s identity;
(2) the appropriation of plaintiff’s name or likeness to defendant’s
advantage, commercially or otherwise; (3) lack of consent; and (4)
resulting injury.” Stewart v. Rolling Stone LLC, 181 Cal.App.4th
664, 105 Cal.Rptr.3d 98, 111 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The same claim under California Civil Code § 3344 requires a
plaintiff to prove “all the elements of the common law cause of
action” plus “a knowing use by the defendant as well as a direct
connection between the alleged use and the commercial purpose.”
Id.
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will prevail on his right-of-publicity claim. This appeal
therefore centers on the applicability of these defenses.
We take each one in turn.5
A
The California Supreme Court formulated the
transformative use defense in Comedy III Productions,
Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 25 Cal.4th 387, 106
Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001). The defense is
“a balancing test between the First Amendment and
the right of publicity based on whether the work in
question adds significant creative elements so as to be
transformed into something more than a mere celebrity
likeness or imitation.” Id. at 799. The California
Supreme Court explained that “when a work contains
significant transformative elements, it is not only
especially worthy of First Amendment protection, but
it is also less likely to interfere with the economic
interest protected by the right of publicity.” Id. at 808.
The court rejected the wholesale importation of the
copyright “fair use” defense into right-of-publicity
claims, but recognized that some aspects of that
defense are “particularly pertinent.” Id.; see 17 U.S.C. §
107; see also SOFA Entm’t, Inc. v. Dodger Prods., Inc.,
709 F.3d 1273, 1277–78 (9th Cir. 2013) (discussing the
“fair use” defense codified in 17 U.S.C. § 107).
Comedy III gives us at least five factors to consider
in determining whether a work is sufficiently
5

Just as we did in Hilton v. Hallmark Cards, we reserve the
question of whether the First Amendment furnishes a defense
other than those the parties raise. 599 F.3d 894, 909 n.11 (9th Cir.
2009).
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transformative to obtain First Amendment protection.
See J. Thomas McCarthy, The Rights of Publicity and
Privacy § 8:72 (2d ed. 2012). First, if “the celebrity
likeness is one of the ‘raw materials’ from which an
original work is synthesized,” it is more likely to be
transformative than if “the depiction or imitation of the
celebrity is the very sum and substance of the work in
question.” Comedy III, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 21 P.3d at
809. Second, the work is protected if it is “primarily the
defendant’s own expression”—as long as that
expression is “something other than the likeness of the
celebrity.” Id. This factor requires an examination of
whether a likely purchaser’s primary motivation is to
buy a reproduction of the celebrity, or to buy the
expressive work of that artist. McCarthy, supra, § 8:72.
Third, to avoid making judgments concerning “the
quality of the artistic contribution,” a court should
conduct an inquiry “more quantitative than qualitative”
and ask “whether the literal and imitative or the
creative elements predominate in the work.” Comedy
III, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 21 P.3d at 809. Fourth, the
California Supreme Court indicated that “a subsidiary
inquiry” would be useful in close cases: whether “the
marketability and economic value of the challenged
work derive primarily from the fame of the celebrity
depicted.” Id. at 810. Lastly, the court indicated that
“when an artist’s skill and talent is manifestly
subordinated to the overall goal of creating a
conventional portrait of a celebrity so as to
commercially exploit his or her fame,” the work is not
transformative. Id.
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We have explained that “[o]nly if [a defendant] is
entitled to the [transformative] defense as a matter of
law can it prevail on its motion to strike,” because the
California Supreme Court “envisioned the application
of the defense as a question of fact.” Hilton, 599 F.3d at
910. As a result, EA “is only entitled to the defense as a
matter of law if no trier of fact could reasonably
conclude that the [game] [i]s not transformative.” Id.
California courts have applied the transformative
use test in relevant situations in four cases. First, in
Comedy III itself, the California Supreme Court
applied the test to T-shirts and lithographs bearing a
likeness of The Three Stooges and concluded that it
could “discern no significant transformative or creative
contribution.” Id. at 811. The court reasoned that the
artist’s “undeniable skill is manifestly subordinated to
the overall goal of creating literal, conventional
depictions of The Three Stooges so as to exploit their
fame.” Id. “[W]ere we to decide that [the artist’s]
depictions were protected by the First Amendment,”
the court continued, “we cannot perceive how the right
of publicity would remain a viable right other than in
cases of falsified celebrity endorsements.” Id.
Second, in Winter v. DC Comics, the California
Supreme Court applied the test to comic books
containing characters Johnny and Edgar Autumn,
“depicted as villainous half-worm, half-human
offspring” but evoking two famous brothers, rockers
Johnny and Edgar Winter. 30 Cal.4th 881, 134
Cal.Rptr.2d 634, 69 P.3d 473, 476 (Cal. 2003). The court
held that “the comic books are transformative and
entitled to First Amendment protection.” Id. at 480. It
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reasoned that the comic books “are not just
conventional depictions of plaintiffs but contain
significant expressive content other than plaintiffs’
mere likenesses.” Id. at 479. “To the extent the
drawings of the Autumn brothers resemble plaintiffs at
all, they are distorted for purposes of lampoon, parody,
or caricature.” Id. Importantly, the court relied on the
fact that the brothers “are but cartoon characters . . . in
a larger story, which is itself quite expressive.” Id.
Third, in Kirby v. Sega of America, Inc., the
California Court of Appeal applied the transformative
use test to a video game in which the user controls the
dancing of “Ulala,” a reporter from outer space
allegedly based on singer Kierin Kirby, whose
“‘signature’ lyrical expression . . . is ‘ooh la la.’” 144
Cal.App.4th 47, 50 Cal.Rptr.3d 607, 609–10 (Ct. App.
2006). The court held that “Ulala is more than a mere
likeness or literal depiction of Kirby,” pointing to
Ulala’s “extremely tall, slender computer-generated
physique,” her “hairstyle and primary costume,” her
dance moves, and her role as “a space-age reporter in
the 25th century,” all of which were “unlike any public
depiction of Kirby.” Id. at 616. “As in Winter, Ulala is a
‘fanciful, creative character’ who exists in the context of
a unique and expressive video game.” Id. at 618.
Finally, in No Doubt v. Activision Publishing, Inc.,
the California Court of Appeal addressed Activision’s
Band Hero video game. 192 Cal.App.4th 1018, 122
Cal.Rptr.3d 397, 400 (Ct. App. 2011), petition for review
denied, 2011 Cal. LEXIS 6100 (Cal. June 8, 2011) (No.
B223996). In Band Hero, users simulate performing in
a rock band in time with popular songs. Id. at 401.
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Users choose from a number of avatars, some of which
represent actual rock stars, including the members of
the rock band No Doubt. Id. at 401. Activision licensed
No Doubt’s likeness, but allegedly exceeded the scope
of the license by permitting users to manipulate the No
Doubt avatars to play any song in the game, solo or
with members of other bands, and even to alter the
avatars’ voices. Id. at 402. The court held that No
Doubt’s right of publicity prevailed despite Activision’s
First Amendment defense because the game was not
“transformative” under the Comedy III test. It
reasoned that the video game characters were “literal
recreations of the band members,” doing “the same
activity by which the band achieved and maintains its
fame.” Id. at 411. According to the court, the fact “that
the avatars appear in the context of a videogame that
contains many other creative elements[] does not
transform the avatars into anything other than exact
depictions of No Doubt’s members doing exactly what
they do as celebrities.” Id. The court concluded that
“the expressive elements of the game remain
manifestly subordinated to the overall goal of creating
a conventional portrait of No Doubt so as to
commercially exploit its fame.” Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted).
We have also had occasion to apply the
transformative use test. In Hilton v. Hallmark Cards,
we applied the test to a birthday card depicting Paris
Hilton in a manner reminiscent of an episode of Hilton’s
reality show The Simple Life. 599 F.3d at 899. We
observed some differences between the episode and the
card, but noted that “the basic setting is the same: we
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see Paris Hilton, born to privilege, working as a
waitress.” Id. at 911. We reasoned that “[w]hen we
compare Hallmark’s card to the video game in Kirby,
which transported a 1990s singer (catchphrases and all)
into the 25th century and transmogrified her into a
space-age reporter, . . . the card falls far short of the
level of new expression added in the video game.” Id.
As a result, we concluded that “there is enough doubt
as to whether Hallmark’s card is transformative under
our case law that we cannot say Hallmark is entitled to
the defense as a matter of law.” Id.6
With these cases in mind as guidance, we conclude
that EA’s use of Keller’s likeness does not contain
significant transformative elements such that EA is
entitled to the defense as a matter of law. The facts of
No Doubt are very similar to those here. EA is alleged
to have replicated Keller’s physical characteristics in
NCAA Football, just as the members of No Doubt are
realistically portrayed in Band Hero. Here, as in Band
Hero, users manipulate the characters in the
performance of the same activity for which they are
known in real life—playing football in this case, and
6

We also briefly addressed the transformative use test in a
footnote in Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180
(9th Cir. 2001). We indicated that if we had considered the test, we
would have concluded that an image of Dustin Hoffman from
“Tootsie” that had been altered to make it appear like he was
wearing fashions from a decade later “contained ‘significant
transformative elements.’” Id. at 1184 n.2; 1182–83. “Hoffman’s
body was eliminated and a new, differently clothed body was
substituted in its place. In fact, the entire theory of Hoffman’s case
rests on his allegation that the photograph is not a ‘true’ or ‘literal’
depiction of him, but a false portrayal.” Id. at 1184 n.2.
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performing in a rock band in Band Hero. The context in
which the activity occurs is also similarly realistic—real
venues in Band Hero and realistic depictions of actual
football stadiums in NCAA Football. As the district
court found, Keller is represented as “what he was: the
starting quarterback for Arizona State” and Nebraska,
and “the game’s setting is identical to where the public
found [Keller] during his collegiate career: on the
football field.” Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc., No. C 09–1967
CW, 2010 WL 530108, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2010).
EA argues that the district court erred in focusing
primarily on Keller’s likeness and ignoring the
transformative elements of the game as a whole. Judge
Thomas, our dissenting colleague, suggests the same.
See Dissent at 34. We are unable to say that there was
any error, particularly in light of No Doubt, which
reasoned much the same as the district court in this
case: “that the avatars appear in the context of a
videogame that contains many other creative
elements[] does not transform the avatars into
anything other than exact depictions of No Doubt’s
members doing exactly what they do as
celebrities.” No Doubt, 122 Cal.Rptr.3d at 411. 7 EA
7

Judge Thomas argues that the “sheer number of virtual actors,”
the absence of “any evidence as to the personal marketing power
of Sam Keller,” and the relative anonymity of each individual
player in NCAA Football as compared to the public figures in
other California right-of publicity cases all mitigate in favor of
finding that the EA’s First Amendment rights outweigh Keller’s
right of publicity. See Dissent at 37–40. These facts are not
irrelevant to the analysis—they all can be considered in the
framework of the five considerations from Comedy III laid out
above—but the fact is that EA elected to use avatars that mimic
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suggests that the fact that NCAA Football users can
alter the characteristics of the avatars in the game is
significant. Again, our dissenting colleague agrees. See
Dissent at 36–37. In No Doubt, the California Court of
Appeal noted that Band Hero “d[id] not permit players
to alter the No Doubt avatars in any respect.” Id. at
410. The court went on to say that the No Doubt
avatars “remain at all times immutable images of the
real celebrity musicians, in stark contrast to the
‘fanciful, creative characters’ in Winter and Kirby.” Id.
The court explained further:
[I]t is the differences between Kirby and the
instant case . . . which are determinative. In
Kirby, the pop singer was portrayed as an
entirely new character—the space-age news
reporter Ulala. In Band Hero, by contrast, no
matter what else occurs in the game during the
depiction of the No Doubt avatars, the avatars
perform rock songs, the same activity by which
the band achieved and maintains its fame.
Moreover, the avatars perform those songs as
literal recreations of the band members. That
the avatars can be manipulated to perform at
fanciful venues including outer space or to sing
songs the real band would object to singing, or
that the avatars appear in the context of a
real college football players for a reason. If EA did not think there
was value in having an avatar designed to mimic each individual
player, it would not go to the lengths it does to achieve realism in
this regard. Having chosen to use the players’ likenesses, EA
cannot now hide behind the numerosity of its potential offenses or
the alleged unimportance of any one individual player.
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videogame that contains many other creative
elements, does not transform the avatars into
anything other than exact depictions of No
Doubt’s members doing exactly what they do as
celebrities.
Id. at 410–11. Judge Thomas says that “[t]he Court of
Appeal cited character immutability as a chief factor
distinguishing [No Doubt] from Winter and Kirby.”
Dissent at 37. Though No Doubt certainly mentioned
the immutability of the avatars, we do not read the
California Court of Appeal’s decision as turning on the
inability of users to alter the avatars. The key contrast
with Winter and Kirby was that in those games the
public figures were transformed into “fanciful, creative
characters” or “portrayed as . . . entirely new
character[s].” No Doubt, 122 Cal.Rptr.3d at 410. On this
front, our case is clearly aligned with No Doubt, not
with Winter and Kirby. We believe No Doubt offers a
persuasive precedent that cannot be materially
distinguished from Keller’s case.8,9
8

EA further argues that No Doubt is distinguishable because the
video game company in that case entered into a license agreement
which it allegedly breached. However, the California Court of
Appeal did not rely on breach of contract in its analysis of whether
the game was transformative. 122 Cal.Rptr.3d at 412 n.7. Keller
asserts here that EA contracted away its First Amendment rights
in a licensing agreement with the NCAA that purportedly
prohibited the use of athlete likenesses. However, in light of our
conclusion that EA is not entitled to a First Amendment defense
as a matter of law, we need not reach this issue and leave it for the
district court to address in the first instance on remand should the
finder of fact determine in post-SLAPP proceedings that EA’s use
is transformative.
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The Third Circuit came to the same conclusion in
Hart v. Electronic Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141 (3d Cir.
2013). In Hart, EA faced a materially identical
challenge under New Jersey right-of-publicity law,
brought by former Rutgers quarterback Ryan Hart.
See id. at 163 n.28 (“Keller is simply [Hart ] incarnated
in California.”). Though the Third Circuit was tasked
with interpreting New Jersey law, the court looked to
the transformative use test developed in California. See
id. at 158 n.23 (noting that the right-of-publicity laws
are “strikingly similar . . . and protect similar interests”
in New Jersey and California, and that “consequently
[there is] no issue in applying balancing tests developed
in California to New Jersey”); see also id. at 165
(holding that “the Transformative Use Test is the
proper analytical framework to apply to cases such as
the one at bar”). Applying the test, the court held that
“the NCAA Football . . . games at issue . . . do not
sufficiently transform [Hart]’s identity to escape the

9

In dissent, Judge Thomas suggests that this case is
distinguishable from other right-to-publicity cases because “an
individual college athlete’s right of publicity is extraordinarily
circumscribed and, in practical reality, nonexistent” because
“NCAA rules prohibit athletes from benefitting economically from
any success on the field.” Dissent at 41. Judge Thomas
commendably addresses the fairness of this structure, see Dissent
at 41–42 n.5, but setting fairness aside, the fact is that college
athletes are not indefinitely bound by NCAA rules. Once an
athlete graduates from college, for instance, the athlete can
capitalize on his success on the field during college in any number
of ways. EA’s use of a college athlete’s likeness interferes with the
athlete’s right to capitalize on his athletic success once he is
beyond the dominion of NCAA rule.
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right of publicity claim,” reversing the district court’s
grant of summary judgment to EA. Id. at 170.
As we have, the Third Circuit considered the
potentially transformative nature of the game as a
whole, id. at 166, 169, and the user’s ability to alter
avatar characteristics, id. at 166–68. Asserting that
“the lack of transformative context is even more
pronounced here than in No Doubt,” id. at 166, and that
“the ability to modify the avatar counts for little where
the appeal of the game lies in users’ ability to play as, or
alongside [,] their preferred players or team,” id. at 168
(internal quotation marks omitted), the Third Circuit
agreed with us that these changes do not render the
NCAA Football games sufficiently transformative to
defeat a right-of-publicity claim.
Judge Ambro dissented in Hart, concluding that
“the creative components of NCAA Football contain
sufficient expressive transformation to merit First
Amendment protection.” Id. at 175 (Ambro, J.,
dissenting). But in critiquing the majority opinion,
Judge Ambro disregarded No Doubt and Kirby because
“they were not decided by the architect of the
Transformative Use Test, the Supreme Court of
California.” Id. at 172 n.4. He thus “d [id] not attempt to
explain or distinguish the[se cases’] holdings except to
note that [he] believe[s] No Doubt, which focused on
individual depictions rather than the work in its
entirety, was wrongly decided in light of the prior
precedent in Comedy III and Winter.” Id. We recognize
that we are bound only by the decisions of a state’s
highest court and not by decisions of the state’s
intermediate appellate court when considering statelaw
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issues sitting in diversity jurisdiction. See In re
Kirkland, 915 F.2d 1236, 1238–39 (9th Cir. 1990).
Nonetheless, where there is no binding precedent from
the state’s highest court, we “must predict how the
highest state court would decide the issue using
intermediate appellate court decisions, decisions from
other
jurisdictions,
statutes,
treatises,
and
restatements as guidance.” Id. at 1239 (emphasis
added). As stated above, we believe No Doubt in
particular provides persuasive guidance. We do not
believe No Doubt to be inconsistent with the California
Supreme Court’s relevant decisions, and we will not
disregard a well-reasoned decision from a state’s
intermediate appellate court in this context. Like the
majority in Hart, we rely substantially on No Doubt,
and believe we are correct to do so.
Given that NCAA Football realistically portrays
college football players in the context of college football
games, the district court was correct in concluding that
EA cannot prevail as a matter of law based on the
transformative use defense at the anti-SLAPP stage.
Cf. Hilton, 599 F.3d at 910–11.10
10

Judge Thomas asserts that “[t]he logical consequence of the
majority view is that all realistic depictions of actual persons, no
matter how incidental, are protected by a state law right of
publicity regardless of the creative context,” “jeopardiz[ing] the
creative use of historic figures in motion pictures, books, and
sound recordings.” Dissent at 43. We reject the notion that our
holding has such broad consequences. As discussed above, one of
the factors identified in Comedy III “requires an examination of
whether a likely purchaser’s primary motivation is to buy a
reproduction of the celebrity, or to buy the expressive work of that
artist.” McCarthy, supra, § 8:72; see Comedy III, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d
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B
EA urges us to adopt for right-of-publicity claims
the broader First Amendment defense that we have
previously adopted in the context of false endorsement
claims under the Lanham Act: the Rogers test.11 See
Brown v. Elec. Arts, No. 09–56675, slip op. at 5–6
(applying the Rogers test to a Lanham Act claim
brought by former NFL player Jim Brown relating to
the use of his likeness in EA’s Madden NFL video
games).
Rogers v. Grimaldi is a landmark Second Circuit
case balancing First Amendment rights against claims
under the Lanham Act. 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir.1989). The
case involved a suit brought by the famous performer
Ginger Rogers against the producers and distributors
of Ginger and Fred, a movie about two fictional Italian
cabaret performers who imitated Rogers and her
frequent performing partner Fred Astaire. Id. at
996–97. Rogers alleged both a violation of the Lanham
Act for creating the false impression that she endorsed
the film and infringement of her common law right of
publicity. Id. at 997.
126, 21 P.3d at 809. Certainly this leaves room for distinguishing
between this case-where we have emphasized EA’s primary
emphasis on reproducing reality-and cases involving other kinds of
expressive works.
11

Keller argues that EA never asked the district court to apply
Rogers and has therefore waived the issue on appeal. Although it
could have been more explicit, EA’s anti-SLAPP motion did cite
Rogers and argue that Keller had not alleged that his likeness was
“wholly unrelated” to the content of the video game or a “disguised
commercial advertisement,” the two prongs of the Rogers test.
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The Rogers court recognized that “[m]ovies, plays,
books, and songs are all indisputably works of artistic
expression and deserve protection,” but that “[t]he
purchaser of a book, like the purchaser of a can of peas,
has a right not to be misled as to the source of the
product.” Id. “Consumers of artistic works thus have a
dual interest: They have an interest in not being misled
and they also have an interest in enjoying the results of
the author’s freedom of expression.” Id. at 998. The
Rogers court determined that titles of artistic or
literary works were less likely to be misleading than
“the names of ordinary commercial products,” and thus
that Lanham Act protections applied with less rigor
when considering titles of artistic or literary works
than when considering ordinary products. Id. at
999–1000. The court concluded that “in general the Act
should be construed to apply to artistic works only
where the public interest in avoiding consumer
confusion outweighs the public interest in free
expression.” Id. at 999. The court therefore held:
In the context of allegedly misleading titles
using a celebrity’s name, that balance will
normally not support application of the
[Lanham] Act unless the title has no artistic
relevance to the underlying work whatsoever,
or, if it has some artistic relevance, unless the
title explicitly misleads as to the source or the
content of the work.
Id.
We first endorsed the Rogers test for Lanham Act
claims involving artistic or expressive works in Mattel,
Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 902 (9th Cir.
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2002). We agreed that, in the context of artistic and
literary titles, “[c]onsumers expect a title to
communicate a message about the book or movie, but
they do not expect it to identify the publisher or
producer,” and “adopt[ed] the Rogers standard as our
own.” Id. Then, in E.S.S. Entertainment 2000, Inc. v.
Rock Star Videos, Inc., we considered a claim by a strip
club owner that video game maker Rock Star
incorporated its club logo into the game’s virtual
depiction of East Los Angeles, violating the club’s
trademark right to that logo. 547 F.3d 1095, 1096–98
(9th Cir. 2008). We held that Rock Star’s use of the logo
and trade dress was protected by the First
Amendment and that it therefore could not be held
liable under the Lanham Act. Id. at 1099–1101. In so
doing, we extended the Rogers test slightly, noting
that “[a]lthough this test traditionally applies to uses of
a trademark in the title of an artistic work, there is no
principled reason why it ought not also apply to the use
of a trademark in the body of the work.” Id. at 1099.
In this case, EA argues that we should extend this
test, created to evaluate Lanham Act claims, to apply
to right-of-publicity claims because it is “less prone to
misinterpretation” and “more protective of free
expression” than the transformative use defense.
Although we acknowledge that there is some overlap
between the transformative use test formulated by the
California Supreme Court and the Rogers test, we
disagree that the Rogers test should be imported
wholesale for right-of-publicity claims. Our conclusion
on this point is consistent with the Third Circuit’s
rejection of EA’s identical argument in Hart. See Hart,
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717 F.3d at 154–58. As the history and development of
the Rogers test makes clear, it was designed to protect
consumers from the risk of consumer confusion—the
hallmark element of a Lanham Act claim. See Cairns v.
Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1149 (9th Cir. 2002).
The right of publicity, on the other hand, does not
primarily seek to prevent consumer confusion. See
Hart, 717 F.3d at 158 (“[T]he right of publicity does not
implicate the potential for consumer confusion. . . .”).
Rather, it primarily “protects a form of intellectual
property [in one’s person] that society deems to have
some social utility.” Comedy III, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 126,
21 P.3d at 804. As the California Supreme Court has
explained:
Often considerable money, time and energy are
needed to develop one’s prominence in a particular
field. Years of labor may be required before one’s
skill, reputation, notoriety or virtues are sufficiently
developed to permit an economic return through
some medium of commercial promotion. For some,
the investment may eventually create considerable
commercial value in one’s identity.
Id. at 804–05 (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
The right of publicity protects the celebrity, not the
consumer. Keller’s publicity claim is not founded on an
allegation that consumers are being illegally misled into
believing that he is endorsing EA or its products.
Indeed, he would be hard-pressed to support such an
allegation absent evidence that EA explicitly misled
consumers into holding such a belief. See Brown v. Elec.
Arts, No. 09–56675, slip op. at 23 (holding under the
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Rogers test that, since “Brown’s likeness is artistically
relevant to the [Madden NFL] games and there are no
alleged facts to support the claim that EA explicitly
misled consumers as to Brown’s involvement with the
games,” “the public interest in free expression
outweighs the public interest in avoiding consumer
confusion”). Instead, Keller’s claim is that EA has
appropriated, without permission and without
providing compensation, his talent and years of hard
work on the football field. The reasoning of the Rogers
and Mattel courts—that artistic and literary works
should be protected unless they explicitly mislead
consumers—is simply not responsive to Keller’s
asserted interests here. Cf. Hart, 717 F.3d at 157
(“Effectively, [EA] argues that [Hart] should be unable
to assert a claim for appropriating his likeness as a
football player precisely because his likeness was used
for a game about football. Adopting this line of
reasoning threatens to turn the right of publicity on its
head.”).
We recognize that Rogers also dealt with a
right-of-publicity claim-one under Oregon law—and
applied a modified version of its Lanham Act test in
order to adapt to that particular context:
In light of the Oregon Court’s concern for the
protection of free expression, . . . the right of
publicity [would not] bar the use of a celebrity’s
name in a movie title unless the title was “wholly
unrelated” to the movie or was “simply a
disguised commercial advertisement for the sale
of goods or services.”
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875 F.2d at 1004. However, the Rogers court was faced
with a situation in which the “Oregon Courts . . . [had]
not determined the scope of the common law right of
publicity in that state.” Id. at 1002. In the absence of
clear state-law precedent, the Rogers court was
“obliged to engage in the uncertain task of predicting
what the New York courts would predict the Oregon
courts would rule as to the contours of a right of
publicity under Oregon law.” Id. In light of Comedy III
and its progeny, we are faced with no such uncertain
task.
Lastly, we note that the only circuit court to import
the Rogers test into the publicity arena, the Sixth
Circuit, has done so inconsistently. In Parks v. LaFace
Records, the Sixth Circuit indicated that the Rogers
test was appropriate for right-of-publicity claims,
noting that the Restatement (Third) of Unfair
Competition had endorsed use of the test in that
context. 329 F.3d 437, 461 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 47
cmt. c). Subsequently, in ETW Corp. v. Jireh
Publishing, Inc., the court acknowledged the Parks
decision but did not apply the Rogers test to the Ohio
right-of-publicity claim in question. 332 F.3d at 915, 936
& n.17 (6th Cir. 2003). Instead, the court applied a
balancing test from comment d in the Restatement
(analyzing “the substantiality and market effect of the
use of the celebrity’s image . . . in light of the
informational and creative content”), as well as the
transformative use test from Comedy III. Id. at 937–38;
see Hart, 717 F.3d at 157 (“We find Parks to be less
than persuasive [as to the applicability of the Rogers

26a
test to rightof-publicity cases] given that just over a
month later another panel of the Sixth Circuit decided
[ETW], a right of publicity case where the Circuit
applied the Transformative Use Test.”). Similarly, the
Tenth Circuit in Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League
Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959 (10th Cir. 1996),
and the Eighth Circuit in C.B.C. Distribution and
Marketing, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced
Media, L.P., 505 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2007), rejected the
Rogers test in favor of a flexible case-by-case approach
that takes into account the celebrity’s interest in
retaining his or her publicity and the public’s interest in
free expression. Therefore, we decline EA’s invitation
to extend the Rogers test to right-of-publicity claims.
C
California has developed two additional defenses
aimed at protecting the reporting of factual information
under state law. One of these defenses only applies to
common law rightof-publicity claims while the other
only applies to statutory right-of-publicity claims.
Montana v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc., 34
Cal.App.4th 790, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 639, 640 (Ct. App.
1995). Liability will not lie for common law
right-of-publicity claims for the “publication of matters
in the public interest.” Id. at 640–41. Similarly, liability
will not lie for statutory right-of-publicity claims for the
“use of a name, voice, signature, photograph, or
likeness in connection with any news, public affairs, or
sports broadcast or account, or any political campaign.”
Cal. Civ. Code § 3344(d). Although these defenses are
based on First Amendment concerns, Gill v. Hearst
Publ’g Co., 40 Cal.2d 224, 253 P.2d 441, 443–44 (Cal.
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1953), they are not coextensive with the Federal
Constitution, New Kids on the Block v. News Am.
Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 310 n.10 (9th Cir. 1992), and
their application is thus a matter of state law.
EA argues that these defenses give it the right to
“incorporate athletes’ names, statistics, and other
biographical information” into its expressive works, as
the defenses were “designed to create ‘extra breathing
space’ for the use of a person’s name in connection with
matters of public interest.” Keller responds that the
right of publicity yields to free use of a public figure’s
likeness only to the extent reasonably required to
report information to the public or publish factual data,
and that the defenses apply only to broadcasts or
accounts of public affairs, not to EA’s NCAA Football
games, which do not contain or constitute such
reporting about Keller.
California courts have generally analyzed the
common law defense and the statutory defense
separately, but it is clear that both defenses protect
only the act of publishing or reporting. By its terms,
§ 3344(d) is limited to a “broadcast or account,” and we
have confirmed that the common law defense is about a
publication or reporting of newsworthy items. Hilton,
599 F.3d at 912. However, most of the discussion by
California courts pertains to whether the subject
matter of the communication is of “public interest” or
related to “news” or “public affairs,” leaving little
guidance as to when the communication constitutes a
publication or reporting.
For instance, in Dora v. Frontline Video, Inc., a well
known surfer sued the producer of a documentary on
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surfing entitled “The Legends of Malibu,” claiming
misappropriation of his name and likeness. 15
Cal.App.4th 536, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 790, 791 (Ct. App.
1993). The court held that the documentary was
protected because it was “a fair comment on real life
events which have caught the popular imagination.” Id.
at 792 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court
explained that surfing “has created a lifestyle that
influences speech, behavior, dress, and entertainment,”
has had “an economic impact,” and “has also had a
significant influence on the popular culture,” such that
“[i]t would be difficult to conclude that a surfing
documentary does not fall within the category of public
affairs.” Id. at 794–95. Similarly, in Gionfriddo v. Major
League Baseball, retired professional baseball players
alleged that Major League Baseball violated their right
of publicity by displaying “factual data concerning the
players, their performance statistics, and verbal
descriptions and video depictions of their play” in game
programs and on its website. 94 Cal.App.4th 400, 114
Cal.Rptr.2d 307, 314 (Ct. App. 2001). The court
reasoned that “[t]he recitation and discussion of factual
data concerning the athletic performance of these
plaintiffs command a substantial public interest, and,
therefore, is a form of expression due substantial
constitutional protection.” Id. at 315. And in Montana
v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc., former NFL
quarterback Joe Montana brought a right-ofpublicity
action against a newspaper for selling posters
containing previously published pages from the
newspaper depicting the many Super Bowl victories by
Montana and the San Francisco 49ers. Montana, 40
Cal.Rptr.2d at 639–40. The court found that “[p]osters
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portraying the 49’ers’ [sic] victories are . . . a form of
public interest presentation to which protection must
be extended.” Id. at 641 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
We think that, unlike in Gionfriddo, Montana, and
Dora, EA is not publishing or reporting factual data.
EA’s video game is a means by which users can play
their own virtual football games, not a means for
obtaining information about real-world football games.
Although EA has incorporated certain actual player
information into the game (height, weight, etc.), its case
is considerably weakened by its decision not to include
the athletes’ names along with their likenesses and
statistical data. EA can hardly be considered to be
“reporting” on Keller’s career at Arizona State and
Nebraska when it is not even using Keller’s name in
connection with his avatar in the game. Put simply,
EA’s interactive game is not a publication of facts about
college football; it is a game, not a reference source.
These state law defenses, therefore, do not apply.12

12

We similarly reject Judge Thomas’s argument that Keller’s
right-of publicity claim should give way to the First Amendment
in light of the fact that “the essence of NCAA Football is founded
on publicly available data.” Dissent at 40. Judge Thomas compares
NCAA Football to the fantasy baseball products that the Eighth
Circuit deemed protected by the First Amendment in the face of a
right-of-publicity claim in C.B.C. Distribution and Marketing, 505
F.3d at 823–24. Dissent at 40. But there is a big difference between
a video game like NCAA Football and fantasy baseball products
like those at issue in C.B.C. Those products merely “incorporate[d]
the names along with performance and biographical data of actual
major league baseball players.” Id. at 820. NCAA Football, on the
other hand, uses virtual likenesses of actual college football
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III
Under California’s transformative use defense,
EA’s use of the likenesses of college athletes like
Samuel Keller in its video games is not, as a matter of
law, protected by the First Amendment. We reject
EA’s suggestion to import the Rogers test into the
right-of-publicity arena, and conclude that statelaw
defenses for the reporting of information do not protect
EA’s use.
AFFIRMED.

players. It is seemingly true that each likeness is generated
largely from publicly available data—though, as Judge Thomas
acknowledges, EA solicits certain information directly from
schools—but finding this fact dispositive would neuter the right of
publicity in our digital world. Computer programmers with the
appropriate expertise can create a realistic likeness of any
celebrity using only publicly available data. If EA creates a virtual
likeness of Tom Brady using only publicly available data—public
images and videos of Brady—does EA have free reign to use that
likeness in commercials without violating Brady’s right of
publicity? We think not, and thus must reject Judge Thomas’s
point about the public availability of much of the data used given
that EA produced and used actual likenesses of the athletes
involved.
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THOMAS, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
Because the creative and transformative elements
of Electronic Arts’ NCAA Football video game series
predominate over the commercial use of the athletes’
likenesses, the First Amendment protects EA from
liability. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
I
As expressive works, video games are entitled to
First Amendment protection. Brown v. Entm’t
Merchs. Ass’n, ––– U.S. ––––, ––––, 131 S. Ct. 2729,
2733, 180 L. Ed. 2d 708 (2011). The First Amendment
affords additional protection to NCAA Football
because it involves a subject of substantial public
interest: collegiate football. Moore v. Univ. of Notre
Dame, 968 F. Supp. 1330, 1337 (N.D. Ind. 1997).
Because football is a matter of public interest, the use
of the images of athletes is entitled to constitutional
protection, even if profits are involved. Montana v. San
Jose Mercury News, Inc., 34 Cal.App.4th 790, 40
Cal.Rptr.2d 639, 643 n.2 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995); see also
Cal. Civ. Code §3344(d) (exempting from liability the
“use of a name . . . or likeness in connection with any . . .
public affairs, or sports broadcast or account”).
Where it is recognized, the tort of appropriation is a
creature of common law or statute, depending on the
jurisdiction. However, the right to compensation for
the misappropriation for commercial use of one’s image
or celebrity is far from absolute. In every jurisdiction,
any right of publicity must be balanced against the
constitutional protection afforded by the First
Amendment. Courts have employed a variety of
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methods in balancing the rights. See, e .g., Doe v. TCI
Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 374 (Mo. 2003) (en banc).
The
California
Supreme
Court
applies
a
“transformative use” test it formulated in Comedy III
Productions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 25 Cal.4th 387,
106 Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001).1
As the majority properly notes, the transformative
use defense is “a balancing test between the First
Amendment and the right of publicity based on
whether the work in question adds significant creative
elements so as to be transformed into something more
than a mere celebrity likeness or imitation.” Comedy
III, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 21 P.3d at 799. The rationale
for the test, as the majority notes, is that “when a work
contains significant transformative elements, it is not
only especially worthy of First Amendment protection,
but it is also less likely to interfere with the economic
interest protected by the right of publicity.” Id. at 808.
The five considerations articulated in Comedy III,
and cited by the majority, are whether: (1) the celebrity
likeness is one of the raw materials from which an
1

I agree with the majority that the test articulated in Rogers v.
Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989), should not be employed in
this context. The Rogers test is appropriately applied in Lanham
Act cases, where the primary concern is with the danger of
consumer confusion when a work is depicted as something it is not.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1). However, the right of publicity is an
economic right to use the value of one own’s celebrity. Zacchini v.
Scripps–Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576–77, 97 S. Ct. 2849,
53 L. Ed. 2d 965 (1977). Therefore, a more nuanced balancing is
required. In our context, I believe the transformative use test—if
correctly applied to the work as a whole—provides the proper
analytical framework.
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original work is synthesized; (2) the work is primarily
the defendant’s own expression if the expression is
something other than the likeness of the celebrity; (3)
the literal and imitative or creative elements
predominate in the work; (4) the marketability and
economic value of the challenged work derives
primarily from the fame of the celebrity depicted; and
(5) an artist’s skill and talent has been manifestly
subordinated to the overall goal of creating a
conventional portrait of a celebrity so as to
commercially exploit the celebrity’s fame. Id. at 809–10.
Although these considerations are often distilled as
analytical factors, Justice Mosk was careful in Comedy
III not to label them as such. Indeed, the focus of
Comedy III is a more holistic examination of whether
the transformative and creative elements of a
particular work predominate over commercially based
literal or imitative depictions. The distinction is critical,
because excessive deconstruction of Comedy III can
lead to misapplication of the test. And it is at this
juncture that I must respectfully part ways with my
colleagues in the majority.
The majority confines its inquiry to how a single
athlete’s likeness is represented in the video game,
rather than examining the transformative and creative
elements in the video game as a whole. In my view, this
approach contradicts the holistic analysis required by
the transformative use test. See Hart v. Elec. Arts,
Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 170–76 (3d Cir. 2013) (Ambro, J.,
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dissenting).2 The salient question is whether the entire
work
is
transformative,
and
whether
the
transformative elements predominate, rather than
whether an individual persona or image has been
altered.
When EA’s NCAA Football video game series is
examined carefully, and put in proper context, I
conclude that the creative and transformative elements
of the games predominate over the commercial use of
the likenesses of the athletes within the games.
A
The first step in conducting a balancing is to
examine the creative work at issue. At its essence,
EA’s NCAA Football is a work of interactive historical
fiction. Although the game changes from year to year,
its most popular features predominately involve
role-playing by the gamer. For example, a player can
create a virtual image of himself as a potential college
football player. The virtual player decides which
position he would like to play, then participates in a
series of “tryouts” or competes in an entire high school
season to gauge his skill. Based on his performance, the
virtual player is ranked and available to play at select
colleges. The player chooses among the colleges, then
assumes the role of a college football player. He also
selects a major, the amount of time he wishes to spend
on social activities, and practice—all of which may
affect the virtual player’s performance. He then plays
2

I agree fully with Judge Ambro’s excellent dissent in Hart, which
describes the analytic flaws of applying a transformative use test
outside the context of the work as a whole.
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his position on the college team. In some versions of the
game, in another mode, the virtual player can engage in
a competition for the Heisman Trophy. In another
popular mode, the gamer becomes a virtual coach. The
coach scouts, recruits, and develops entirely fictional
players for his team. The coach can then promote the
team’s evolution over decades of seasons.
The college teams that are supplied in the game do
replicate the actual college teams for that season,
including virtual athletes who bear the statistical and
physical dimensions of the actual college athletes. But,
unlike their professional football counterparts in the
Madden NFL series, the NCAA football players in
these games are not identified.
The gamers can also change their abilities,
appearances, and physical characteristics at will.
Keller’s impressive physical likeness can be morphed
by the gamer into an overweight and slow virtual
athlete, with anemic passing ability. And the gamer can
create new virtual players out of whole cloth. Players
can change teams. The gamer could pit Sam Keller
against himself, or a stronger or weaker version of
himself, on a different team. Or the gamer could play
the game endlessly without ever encountering Keller’s
avatar. In the simulated games, the gamer controls not
only the conduct of the game, but the weather, crowd
noise, mascots, and other environmental factors. Of
course, one may play the game leaving the players
unaltered, pitting team against team. But, in this
context as well, the work is one of historic fiction. The
gamer controls the teams, players, and games.
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Applying the Comedy III considerations to NCAA
Football in proper holistic context, the considerations
favor First Amendment protection. The athletic
likenesses are but one of the raw materials from which
the broader game is constructed. The work, considered
as a whole, is primarily one of EA’s own expression.
The creative and transformative elements predominate
over the commercial use of likenesses. The
marketability and economic value of the game comes
from the creative elements within, not from the pure
commercial exploitation of a celebrity image. The game
is not a conventional portrait of a celebrity, but a work
consisting of many creative and transformative
elements.
The video game at issue is much akin to the
creations the California Supreme Court found
protected in Winter v. DC Comics, 30 Cal.4th 881, 134
Cal.Rptr.2d 634, 69 P.3d 473, 476 (Cal. 2003), where the
two fabled guitarists Johnny and Edgar Winter were
easily identifiable, but depicted as chimeras. It is also
consistent with the California Court of Appeal’s
decision in Kirby v. Sega of America, Inc., 144
Cal.App.4th 47, 50 Cal.Rptr.3d 607, 609–10 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2006), where a character easily identified as
singer Kierin Kirby, more popularly known as Lady
Miss Kier, was transformed into a “‘fanciful, creative
character’ who exists in the context of a unique and
expressive video game.” Id. at 618. So, too, are the
virtual players who populate the world of the NCAA
Football series.
No Doubt v. Activision Publishing, Inc., 192
Cal.App.4th 1018, 122 Cal.Rptr.3d 397 (Cal. Ct. App.
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2011), is not to the contrary. The literal representations
in No Doubt were not, and could not be, transformed in
any way. Indeed, in No Doubt, the bandmembers posed
for motion-capture photography to allow reproduction
of their likenesses, id. at 402, and the Court of Appeal
underscored the fact that the video game did not
“permit players to alter the No Doubt avatars in any
respect” and the avatars remained “at all times
immutable images of the real celebrity musicians,” id.
at 410. The Court of Appeal cited character
immutability as a chief factor distinguishing that case
from Winter and Kirby. Id. Unlike the avatars in No
Doubt, the virtual players in NCAA Football are
completely mutable and changeable at the whim of the
gamer. The majority places great reliance on No Doubt
as support for its proposition that the initial placement
of realistic avatars in the game overcomes the First
Amendment’s protection, but the Court of Appeal in No
Doubt rejected such a cramped construction, noting
that “even literal reproductions of celebrities may be
‘transformed’ into expressive works based on the
context into which the celebrity image is placed.” Id. at
410 (citing Comedy III, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 21 P.3d at
797).3
Unlike the majority, I would not punish EA for the
realism of its games and for the skill of the artists who
created realistic settings for the football games.
Majority op. at 21 n.10. That the lifelike roar of the
3

Of course, to the extent that the Court of Appeal’s opinion in No
Doubt may be read to be in tension with the transformative use
test as articulated by the California Supreme Court in Comedy III
and Winter, it must yield.
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crowd and the crunch of pads contribute to the gamer’s
experience demonstrates how little of NCAA Football
is driven by the particular likeness of Sam Keller, or
any of the other plaintiffs, rather than by the game’s
artistic elements.
In short, considering the creative elements alone in
this case satisfies the transformative use test in favor
of First Amendment protection.
B
Although one could leave the analysis with an
examination of the transformative and creative aspects
of the game, a true balancing requires an inquiry as to
the other side of the scales: the publicity right at stake.
Here, as well, the NCAA Football video game series
can be distinguished from the traditional right of
publicity cases, both from a quantitative and a
qualitative perspective.
As a quantitative matter, NCAA Football is
different from other right of publicity cases in the sheer
number of virtual actors involved. Most right of
publicity cases involve either one celebrity, or a finite
and defined group of celebrities. Comedy III involved
literal likenesses of the Three Stooges. Hilton v.
Hallmark Cards, 599 F.3d 894, 909–12 (9th Cir. 2009),
involved the literal likeness of Paris Hilton. Winter
involved the images of the rock star brother duo. Kirby
involved the likeness of one singer. No Doubt focused
on the likenesses of the members of a specific legendary
band.
In contrast, NCAA Football includes not just Sam
Keller, but thousands of virtual actors. This
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consideration is of particular significance when we
examine, as instructed by Comedy III, whether the
source of the product marketability comes from
creative elements or from pure exploitation of a
celebrity image. 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 21 P.3d at 810.
There is not, at this stage of the litigation, any evidence
as to the personal marketing power of Sam Keller, as
distinguished from the appeal of the creative aspects of
the product. Regardless, the sheer number of athletes
involved inevitably diminish the significance of the
publicity right at issue. Comedy III involved literal
depictions of the Three Stooges on lithographs and
T-shirts. Winter involved characters depicted in a
comic strip. Kirby and No Doubt involved pivotal
characters in a video game. The commercial image of
the celebrities in each case was central to the
production, and its contact with the consumer was
immediate and unavoidable. In contrast, one could play
NCAA Football thousands of times without ever
encountering a particular avatar. In context of the
collective, an individual’s publicity right is relatively
insignificant. Put another way, if an anonymous virtual
player is tackled in an imaginary video game and no one
notices, is there any right of publicity infringed at all?
The sheer quantity of the virtual players in the
game underscores the inappropriateness of analyzing
the right of publicity through the lens of one likeness
only. Only when the creative work is considered in
complete context can a proper analysis be conducted.
As a qualitative matter, the essence of NCAA
Football is founded on publicly available data, which is
not protected by any individual publicity rights. It is
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true that EA solicits and receives information directly
from colleges and universities. But the information is
hardly proprietary. Personal vital statistics for players
are found in college programs and media guides.
Likewise, playing statistics are easily available. In this
respect,
the
information
used
by
EA
is
indistinguishable from the information used in fantasy
athletic leagues, for which the First Amendment
provides protection, C.B. C. Distribution & Mktg., Inc.
v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 505
F.3d 818, 823–24 (8th Cir. 2007), or much beloved
statistical board games, such as Strat–OMatic. An
athlete’s right of publicity simply does not encompass
publicly available statistical data. See, e.g., IMS Health
Inc. v. Sorrell, 630 F.3d 263, 271–72 (2d Cir. 2010) (“The
First Amendment protects ‘[e]ven dry information,
devoid of advocacy, political relevance, or artistic
expression.’” (quoting Universal City Studios, Inc. v.
Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 446 (2d Cir. 2001)) (alteration in
original)).4
Further, the structure of the game is not founded on
exploitation of an individual’s publicity rights. The
players are unidentified and anonymous. It is true that
third-party software is available to quickly identify the
players, but that is not part of the EA package. And the
4

Contrary to the majority’s suggestion, I do not claim that any use
of a likeness founded on publicly available information is
transformative. Majority op. 30–31 n.12. The majority’s analogy to
a commercial featuring Tom Brady is inapposite for at least two
reasons: (1) a commercial is not interactive in the same way that
NCAA Football is, and (2) Brady’s marketing power is well
established, while that of the plaintiffs is not.
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fact that the players can be identified by the
knowledgeable user by their position, team, and
statistics is somewhat beside the point. The issue is
whether the marketability of the product is driven by
an individual celebrity, or by the game itself. Comedy
III, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 21 P.3d at 810. Player
anonymity, while certainly not a complete defense,
bears on the question of how we balance the right of
publicity against the First Amendment. This feature of
the game places it in stark contrast with No Doubt,
where the whole point of the enterprise was the
successful commercial exploitation of the specifically
identified, worldfamous musicians.
Finally, as a qualitative matter, the publicity rights
of college athletes are remarkably restricted. This
consideration is critical because the “right to exploit
commercially one’s celebrity is primarily an economic
right.” Gionfriddo v. Major League Baseball, 94
Cal.App.4th 400, 114 Cal.Rptr.2d 307, 318 (Cal. Ct. App.
2001). NCAA rules prohibit athletes from benefitting
economically from any success on the field. NCAA
Bylaw 12.5 specifically prohibits commercial licensing
of an NCAA athlete’s name or picture. NCAA, 2012–13
NCAA Division I Manual § 12.5.2.1 (2012). Before
being allowed to compete each year, all Division I
NCAA athletes must sign a contract stating that they
understand the prohibition on licensing and affirming
that they have not violated any amateurism rules. In
short, even if an athlete wished to license his image to
EA, the athlete could not do so without destroying
amateur status. Thus, an individual college athlete’s
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right of publicity is extraordinarily circumscribed and,
in practical reality, nonexistent.5
In sum, even apart from consideration of
transformative elements, examination of the right of
publicity in question also resolves the balance in favor
of the First Amendment. The quantity of players
involved dilutes the commercial impact of any
particular player and the scope of the publicity right is
significantly reduced by the fact that: (1) a player
cannot own the individual, publicly available statistics
on which the game is based; (2) the players are not
identified in the game; and (3) NCAA college athletes
5

The issue of whether this structure is fair to the student athlete
is beyond the scope of this appeal, but forms a significant backdrop
to the discussion. The NCAA received revenues of $871.6 million
in fiscal year 2011–12, with 81% of the money coming from
television and marketing fees. However, few college athletes will
ever receive any professional compensation. The NCAA reports
that in 2011, there were 67,887 college football players. Of those,
15,086 were senior players, and only 255 athletes were drafted for
a professional team. Thus, only 1.7% of seniors received any
subsequent professional economic compensation for their athletic
endeavors. NCAA, Estimated Probability of Competing in
Athletics Beyond the High School Interscholastic Level (2011),
available
at
http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/
ncaa/pdfs/ 2011/2011 +probability+of+going+pro.
And participation in college football can come at a terrible
cost. The NCAA reports that, during a recent five-year
period, college football players suffered 41,000 injuries,
including 23 non-fatal catastrophic injuries and 11 fatalties
from indirect catastrophic injuries. NCAA, Football
Injuries: Data From the 2004/05 to 2008/09 Seasons,
available
at
http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/
public/ncaa/health+and+safety/sports+injuries/resources/f
ootball+injuries.
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do not have the right to license their names and
likenesses, even if they chose to do so.6
II
Given the proper application of the transformative
use test, Keller is unlikely to prevail. The balance of
interests falls squarely on the side of the First
Amendment. The stakes are not small. The logical
consequence of the majority view is that all realistic
depictions of actual persons, no matter how incidental,
are protected by a state law right of publicity
regardless of the creative context. This logic
jeopardizes the creative use of historic figures in
motion pictures, books, and sound recordings. Absent
the use of actual footage, the motion picture Forrest
Gump might as well be just a box of chocolates.
Without its historical characters, Midnight in Paris
would be reduced to a pedestrian domestic squabble.
The majority’s holding that creative use of realistic
images and personas does not satisfy the
transformative use test cannot be reconciled with the
many cases affording such works First Amendment
6

While acknowledging that these considerations are relevant to
the Comedy III analysis, the majority says EA’s use of realistic
likenesses demonstrates that it sees “value in having an avatar
designed to mimic each individual player.” Majority op. at 17 n.7.
But the same is true of any right of publicity case. The defendants
in Winter saw value in using comic book characters that resembled
the Winter brothers. Andy Warhol—whose portraits were
discussed in Comedy III—saw value in using images of celebrities
such as Marilyn Monroe. In those cases, the products’
marketability derives primarily from the creative elements, not
from a pure commercial exploitation of a celebrity image. The
same is true of NCAA Football.
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protection.7 I respectfully disagree with this potentially
dangerous and out-of-context interpretation of the
transformative use test.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

7

See, e.g., ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir.
2003) (affording First Amendment protection to an artist’s use of
photographs of Tiger Woods); J. Thomas McCarthy, The Rights of
Publicity and Privacy § 8.65 (2013 ed.) (collecting cases); Hart, 717
F.3d at 173 (Ambro, J., dissenting) (describing cases). Football.
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Appendix B
United States District Court
N.D. California
Samuel Michael KELLER, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff,
v.
ELECTRONIC ARTS, INC.; National Collegiate Athletics Association; and Collegiate Licensing Company,
Defendants.
No. C 09–1967 CW.
Feb. 8, 2010.
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS
TO DISMISS (Docket Nos. 34, 47, 48)
AND ELECTRONIC ARTS’ ANTI–SLAPP
MOTION TO STRIKE
(Docket No. 35)
CLAUDIA WILKEN, District Judge.
Defendants Electronic Arts, Inc. (EA), the National
Collegiate Athletics Association (NCAA) and the
Collegiate Licensing Company (CLC) move separately
to dismiss Plaintiff Samuel Michael Keller’s claims
against them. EA also moves to strike Plaintiff’s claims
against it pursuant to California Civil Code section
425.16 (Docket No. 35). Plaintiff opposes the motions.
As amici curiae, James “Jim” Brown and Herbert
Anthony Adderley filed a brief in opposition to EA’s
motion to dismiss. The motions were heard on
December 17, 2009. Having considered all of the papers
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submitted by the parties, the Court DENIES EA’s
Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 34), GRANTS NCAA’s
Motion in part and DENIES it in part (Docket No. 48),
DENIES CLC’s Motion (Docket No. 47) and DENIES
EA’s Motion to Strike (Docket No. 35).
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is a former starting quarterback for the
Arizona State University and University of Nebraska
football teams.
EA, a Delaware corporation with a principal place of
business
in
California,
develops
interactive
entertainment software. It produces, among other
things, the “NCAA Football” series of video games. In
the games, consumers can simulate football matches
between college and university teams. Plaintiff alleges
that, to make the games realistic, EA designs the
virtual football players to resemble real-life college
football athletes, including himself. He claims that
these virtual players are nearly identical to their
real-life counterparts: they share the same jersey
numbers, have similar physical characteristics and
come from the same home state. To enhance the
accuracy of the player depictions, Plaintiff alleges, EA
sends questionnaires to team equipment managers of
college football teams. Although EA omits the real-life
athletes’ names from “NCAA Football,” Plaintiff
asserts that consumers may access online services to
download team rosters and the athletes’ names, and
upload them into the games. Plaintiff claims that, in
recent iterations, EA has included features that
facilitate the upload of this information.
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Plaintiff alleges that EA uses his likeness without
his consent. He asserts that NCAA, an unincorporated
association based in Indiana, and CLC, a Georgia
corporation headquartered in Atlanta, facilitated this
use. Plaintiff claims that EA, NCAA and CLC met at
NCAA’s Indiana headquarters and EA’s California
headquarters to negotiate the agreements that underlie
the alleged misconduct.
Plaintiff alleges other misconduct by NCAA and
CLC, related to NCAA’s amateurism rules. Plaintiff
maintains that NCAA’s approval of EA’s games
violates NCAA’s “duty to NCAA athletes to honor its
own rules prohibiting the use of student likenesses....”
Compl. ¶ 15. He cites NCAA Bylaw 12.5, which
prohibits the commercial licensing of the “name, picture
or likeness” of athletes at NCAA-member institutions.
Compl. ¶ 13. Plaintiff asserts that CLC must honor
NCAA’s prohibitions on the use of student likenesses.
Plaintiff charges NCAA with violations of Indiana’s
right of publicity statute, civil conspiracy and breach of
contract. He charges CLC with civil conspiracy and
unjust enrichment. Against EA, he pleads claims for
violations of California’s statutory and common law
rights of publicity, civil conspiracy, violation of
California’s Unfair Competition Law and unjust
enrichment. He intends to move to certify his case as a
class action and seeks, among other things, damages
and an injunction prohibiting the future use of his and
putative class members’ likenesses.
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LEGAL STANDARD
A complaint must contain a “short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Dismissal under
Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim is appropriate
only when the complaint does not give the defendant
fair notice of a legally cognizable claim and the grounds
on which it rests. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). In
considering whether the complaint is sufficient to state
a claim, the court will take all material allegations as
true and construe them in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff. NL Indus., Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896,
898 (9th Cir. 1986). However, this principle is
inapplicable to legal conclusions; “threadbare recitals of
the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements,” are not taken as true. Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, ––– U.S. ––––, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949–50, 173 L.
Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
DISCUSSION
I.

Indiana Right of Publicity Claim

Plaintiff alleges that NCAA violated his Indiana
right of publicity. He argues that Indiana law applies to
NCAA because its headquarters are located in Indiana
and the alleged violation occurred in Indiana. NCAA
argues that Plaintiff’s claim fails as a matter of law
because he does not allege that it used his image or
likeness. Plaintiff responds that NCAA used his
likeness because it “expressly reviewed and knowingly
approved each version of each NCAA-brand videogame
. . . .” Opp’n to NCAA’s Mot. to Dismiss at 4.
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Under Indiana law, personalities have a property
interest in, among other things, their images and
likenesses. Ind. Code § 32–36–1–7. A personality is a
living or deceased person whose image and likeness
have commercial value. Id. § 32–36–1–6. Indiana Code
section 32–36–1–8 provides,
A person may not use an aspect of a
personality’s right of publicity for a commercial
purpose during the personality’s lifetime or for
one hundred (100) years after the date of the
personality’s death without having obtained
previous written consent from a person . . . .
(emphasis added).
Although the parties do not offer controlling
authority on this point, the plain language of the
statute favors NCAA’s position. Plaintiff argues that
NCAA’s liability under Indiana law arises from its
knowing approval of EA’ s use of his likeness. This
interpretation expands liability under the Indiana
statute to include persons who enable right of publicity
violations. However, Plaintiff does not offer any
authority to show that section 32–36–1–8 encompasses
this type of misconduct. The Court declines to adopt
Plaintiff’s interpretation.
Plaintiff makes a related argument that NCAA
should be held liable under Indiana’s right of publicity
statute as a co-conspirator of EA, which used his
likeness. He cites cases that provide that
co-conspirators can be held liable as joint tortfeasors
for damages caused by another co-conspirator. See, e.g.,
Applied Equip. Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd., 7
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Cal.4th 503, 511, 28 Cal.Rptr.2d 475, 869 P.2d 454
(1994); Boyle v. Anderson Fire Fighters Ass’n Local
1262, 497 N.E.2d 1073, 1079 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986).
However, these cases are inapposite because Plaintiff
has not alleged that either EA or CLC, NCAA’s
alleged co-conspirators, violated Indiana’s right of
publicity statute.
Plaintiff’s Indiana right of publicity claim against
NCAA is dismissed with leave to amend to allege that
NCAA used his likeness or conspired with others to
violate his right of publicity under Indiana law.
II.

California Right of Publicity Claims
California’s right of publicity statute provides,
Any person who knowingly uses another’s name,
voice, signature, photograph, or likeness, in any
manner, on or in products, merchandise, or
goods, or for purposes of advertising or selling,
or
soliciting
purchases
of,
products,
merchandise, goods or services, without such
person’s prior consent . . . shall be liable for any
damages sustained by the person or persons
injured as a result thereof.

Cal. Civ. Code § 3344(a). The statutory right of
publicity complements the common law right of
publicity, which arises from the misappropriation tort
derived from the law of privacy. See Comedy III
Prods., Inc. v. Saderup, 25 Cal.4th 387, 391, 106
Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 21 P.3d 797 (2001). To state a claim
under California common law, a plaintiff must allege
“‘(1) the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s identity; (2)
the appropriation of plaintiff’s name or likeness to
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defendant’s advantage, commercially or otherwise; (3)
lack of consent; and (4) resulting injury.’” Hilton v.
Hallmark Cards, 580 F.3d 874, 889 (9th Cir. 2009)
(quoting Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch, 265 F.3d
994, 1001 (9th Cir. 2001)). Although the statutory and
common law rights are similar, there are differences.
For example, to state a claim under section 3344, a
plaintiff must prove knowing use in addition to
satisfying the elements of a common law claim. Kirby v.
Sega of Am., Inc., 144 Cal.App.4th 47, 55, 50
Cal.Rptr.3d 607 (2006).
EA does not contest the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s
claims. It asserts, however, that his right of publicity
claims are barred by the First Amendment and
California law. The Court considers and rejects each of
these defenses in turn.
A. Transformative Use Defense

1

A defendant may raise an affirmative defense that
the challenged work is “protected by the First
Amendment inasmuch as it contains significant
transformative elements or that the value of the work
does not derive primarily from the celebrity’s fame.”
Hilton, 580 F.3d at 889 (quoting Comedy III, 25 Cal.4th
at 407, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 21 P.3d 797) (internal
quotation marks omitted). The defense “poses what is
essentially a balancing test between the First
Amendment and the right of publicity.” Hilton, 580
1

Amici invite the Court to adopt another standard to assess right
of publicity claims. Because the Court finds that the transformative test is sufficient for the purposes of this motion, it does not
address amici’s arguments.
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F.3d at 889 (quoting Winter v. DC Comics, 30 Cal.4th
881, 885, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 634, 69 P.3d 473 (2003))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
To determine whether a work is transformative, a
court must inquire into
whether the celebrity likeness is one of the “raw
materials” from which an original work is
synthesized, or whether the depiction or
imitation of the celebrity is the very sum and
substance of the work in question. We ask, in
other words, whether a product containing a
celebrity’s likeness is so transformed that it has
become primarily the defendant’s own
expression rather than the celebrity’s likeness.
And when we use the word “expression,” we
mean expression of something other than the
likeness of the celebrity.
Comedy III, 25 Cal.4th at 406, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 21
P.3d 797. “An artist depicting a celebrity must
contribute something more than a merely trivial
variation, but create something recognizably his own, in
order to qualify for legal protection.” Winter, 30 Cal.4th
at 888, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 634, 69 P.3d 473 (quoting
Comedy III, 25 Cal.4th at 408, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 21
P.3d 797) (internal quotation and editing marks
omitted). The analysis “simply requires the court to
examine and compare the allegedly expressive work
with the images of the plaintiff to discern if the
defendant’s work contributes significantly distinctive
and expressive content.” Kirby, 144 Cal.App.4th at 61,
50 Cal.Rptr.3d 607. “If distinctions exist, the First
Amendment bars claims based on appropriation of the
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plaintiff’s identity or likeness; if not, the claims are not
barred.” Id.
Two California Supreme Court cases “bookend the
spectrum” used to measure a work’s transformative
nature. Hilton, 580 F.3d at 890–91. On one end, Comedy
III provides an example of a nontransformative work.
There, the defendant’s “literal, conventional depictions
of The Three Stooges,” drawn in charcoal and printed
on tee-shirts, did not contain transformative elements
that warranted protection by the First Amendment.
Comedy III, 25 Cal.4th at 409, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 21
P.3d 797. Interpreting Comedy III, the Ninth Circuit
stated that “it is clear that merely merchandising a
celebrity’s image without that person’s consent . . . does
not amount to a transformative use.” Hilton, 580 F.3d
at 890.
Winter offers the opposite bookend. There, a comic
book publisher depicted two musicians, Johnny and
Edgar Winter, as half-human, half-worm cartoon
characters. Winter, 30 Cal.4th at 890, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d
634, 69 P.3d 473. The court affirmed summary
judgment in favor of the defendant, holding that the
images were sufficiently transformative. The court
stated,
Although the fictional characters Johnny and
Edgar Autumn are less-than-subtle evocations
of Johnny and Edgar Winter, the books do not
depict plaintiffs literally. Instead, plaintiffs are
merely part of the raw materials from which the
comic books were synthesized.
Id.

54a
Using Comedy III and Winter as guideposts, Kirby
applied the transformative use analysis to a video
game. There, the court held that the main character in
the defendant’s video game was transformed. The
plaintiff was a musician and dancer, known for saying
the phrase “ooh la la.” Kirby, 144 Cal.App.4th at 50–51,
50 Cal.Rptr.3d 607. Ulala, the main character in the
defendant’s game, worked as a news reporter in the
twenty-fifth century, “dispatched to investigate an
invasion of Earth.” Id. at 52, 50 Cal.Rptr.3d 607.
Although there were similarities between the two, the
court held Ulala to be “more than a mere likeness or
literal depiction of Kirby.” Id. at 59, 50 Cal.Rptr.3d 607.
“Ulala contains sufficient expressive content to
constitute a ‘transformative work’ under the test
articulated by the [California] Supreme Court.” Id. In
particular, Ulala was extremely tall and wore clothing
that differed from the plaintiff’s and the setting for the
game was unlike any in which she had appeared. Id.
Here, EA’s depiction of Plaintiff in “NCAA
Football” is not sufficiently transformative to bar his
2
California right of publicity claims as a matter of law.
2

EA asks the Court to take judicial notice of the content of the
video games “NCAA Football 2006” through “NCAA Football
2009,” “NCAA March Madness 2006” through “NCAA March
Madness 2008,” and “NCAA Basketball 2009;” paragraphs four of
the Strauser and O’Brien Declarations summarizing the content of
these video games; various press releases announcing the release
date of the video games; a United States Copyright Office document indicating the date of first publication for “NCAA March
Madness 2007;” an August 15, 2008 order from Kent v. Universal
Studios, Inc., Case No. 08–2704 (C.D. Cal.); and the content of the
CBSSports.com Fantasy College Football game. (Docket No. 36.)
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In the game, the quarterback for Arizona State
University shares many of Plaintiff’s characteristics.
For example, the virtual player wears the same jersey
number, is the same height and weight and hails from
the same state. EA’s depiction of Plaintiff is far from
the transmogrification of the Winter brothers. EA does
not depict Plaintiff in a different form; he is
represented as he what he was: the starting
quarterback for Arizona State University. Further,
unlike in Kirby, the game’s setting is identical to where
the public found Plaintiff during his collegiate career:
on the football field.
EA asserts that the video game, taken as a whole,
contains transformative elements. However, the broad
view EA asks the Court to take is not supported by
precedent. In Winter, the court focused on the
depictions of the plaintiffs, not the content of the other
portions of the comic book. The court in Kirby did the
same: it compared Ulala with the plaintiff; its analysis
Generally, in ruling on a motion to dismiss, a court cannot consider
material outside of the complaint. Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449,
453 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled on other grounds in Galbraith v.
County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 1127 (9th Cir. 2002). However, a court may consider exhibits submitted with the complaint
and those documents “whose contents are alleged in a complaint
and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not
physically attached to the pleading.” Id. at 453–54.
Because Plaintiff refers to the video games in his
complaint, the Court GRANTS EA’s request for judicial
notice of them. Plaintiff does not mention the press
releases or other materials proffered by EA. Therefore,
the Court DENIES EA’s request as to the other
materials.
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did not extend beyond the game’s elements unrelated
to Ulala. These cases show that this Court’s focus must
be on the depiction of Plaintiff in “NCAA Football,” not
the game’s other elements.
Accordingly, at this stage, EA’s transformative use
defense fails.
B. Public Interest Defense
“Under California law, ‘no cause of action will lie for
the publication of matters in the public interest, which
rests on the right of the public to know and the freedom
of the press to tell it.’” Hilton, 580 F.3d at 892 (quoting
Montana v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc., 34
Cal.App.4th 790, 793, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 639 (1995)).
“‘Public interest attaches to people who by their
accomplishments or mode of living create a bona fide
attention to their activities.’” Hilton, 580 F.3d at 892
(quoting Dora v. Frontline Video, Inc., 15 Cal.App.4th
536, 542, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 790 (1993)).
In Gionfriddo v. Major League Baseball, the court
held that the defendants were entitled to the public
interest defense. 94 Cal.App.4th 400, 415, 114
Cal.Rptr.2d 307 (2001). There, the plaintiffs, four
former baseball players, claimed that the defendants’
use of their names and statistics violated their rights of
publicity. Id. at 405–07, 114 Cal.Rptr.2d 307. Their
information appeared on a website, which reported
historical team rosters and listed names of players who
won awards during each season. Id. at 406, 114
Cal.Rptr.2d 307. The defendants also included still
photographs of the plaintiffs from their playing days in
video documentaries. Id. The court characterized these
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uses as “simply making historical facts available to the
public through game programs, Web sites and video
clips.” Id. at 411, 114 Cal.Rptr.2d 307. Because the
public had an interest in the plaintiffs’ athletic
performance, the First Amendment protected the
“recitation and discussion of [their] factual data.” Id.
The public interest defense also applied in Montana.
There, the defendant newspaper sold posters
containing reproductions of newspaper pages reporting
on the San Francisco 49ers’ win in the 1990 Super Bowl;
these pages contained images of the plaintiff. 34
Cal.App.4th at 792, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 639. The plaintiff
conceded that the original newspaper accounts were
protected by the First Amendment, but challenged
their reproduction as posters. Id. at 794, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d
639. The court held that the posters were entitled to
the same First Amendment protection as the original
news stories. The court stated,
Montana’s name and likeness appeared in the
posters for precisely the same reason they
appeared on the original newspaper front pages:
because Montana was a major player in
contemporaneous newsworthy sports events.
Under these circumstances, Montana’s claim
that SJMN used his face and name solely to
extract the commercial value from them fails.
Id. (emphasis in original). Citing Montana, the Ninth
Circuit stated that the public interest defense “is about
. . . publication or reporting.” Hilton, 580 F.3d at 892.
“NCAA Football” is unlike the works in Gionfriddo
and Montana. The game does not merely report or
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publish Plaintiff’s statistics and abilities. On the
contrary, EA enables the consumer to assume the
identity of various student athletes and compete in
simulated college football matches. EA is correct that
products
created
for
entertainment
deserve
constitutional protection. See, e.g., Gionfriddo, 94
Cal.App.4th
at
410,
114
Cal.Rptr.2d
307
(“Entertainment
features
receive
the
same
constitutional protection as factual news reports.”). But
it does not follow that these protections are absolute
and always trump the right of publicity.
EA cites cases in which courts held that the public
interest exception protected online fantasy baseball
and football games. Although these games are more
analogous to “NCAA Football,” the cases are
nonetheless distinguishable. In C.B.C. Distribution and
Marketing v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media,
a declaratory judgment action, the plaintiff sold
“fantasy baseball products” that included the names
and statistics of major league baseball players. 505 F.3d
818, 820–21 (8th Cir. 2007). Through these products,
consumers could form fantasy baseball teams and
compete with other users. Id. at 820. “A participant’s
success ... depend[ed] on the actual performance of the
fantasy team’s players on their respective actual teams
during the course of the major league baseball season.”
Id. at 820–21. The defendant counterclaimed, arguing
that these products violated players’ rights of publicity.
The court disagreed. It analogized the case to
Gionfriddo, and held that the use of the players’
information in the fantasy game was a “‘recitation and
discussion’” of the players’ information. Id. at 823–24
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(quoting Gionfriddo, 94 Cal.App.4th at 411, 114
Cal.Rptr.2d 307).
C.B.C. Distribution is inapplicable here. Success in
“NCAA Football” does not depend on updated reports
of the real-life players’ progress during the college
football season. Further, EA’s game provides more
than just the players’ names and statistics; it offers a
depiction
of
the
student
athletes’
physical
characteristics and, as noted, enables consumers to
control the virtual players on a simulated football field.
EA’ s use of Plaintiff’s likeness goes far beyond what
the court considered in C.B.C. Distribution.
EA is not entitled to the public interest defense on
this motion.
C. Section 3344(d) Exemption
California Civil Code section 3344(d) provides a
public affairs exemption to the statutory right of
publicity. It exempts from liability under section 3344
“a use of a name ... or likeness in connection with any
news, public affairs, or sports broadcast or account, or
any political campaign.” Cal. Civ. Code § 3344(d). This
exemption is not coextensive with the public interest
defense; it “is designed to avoid First Amendment
questions in the area of misappropriation by providing
extra breathing space for the use of a person’s name in
connection with matters of public interest.” New Kids
on the Block v. News Am. Pub., Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 310
n.10 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Eastwood v. Superior Court,
149 Cal.App.3d 409, 421, 198 Cal.Rptr. 342 (1983)).
In Dora v. Frontline Video, Inc., a California court
held that section 3344(d) barred a plaintiff’s statutory
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right of publicity claim. 15 Cal.App.4th at 546, 18
Cal.Rptr.2d 790. The defendant’s documentary on
surfing contained, among other things, the plaintiff’s
name and likeness. Id. at 540, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 790. The
court held that this use was exempted by section
3344(d) because the plaintiff’s name and likeness were
used in connection with public affairs. In doing so, the
court addressed the meaning of “public affairs.” The
court distinguished “public affairs” from “news,”
stating that “‘public affairs’ was intended to mean
something less important than news.” Dora, 15
Cal.App.4th at 545, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 790. Thus, the
subject matter encompassed by public affairs is not
limited “to topics that might be covered on public
television or public radio.” Id. at 546, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d
790.
Here, Plaintiff does not dispute EA’s contention
that college athletics are “public affairs.” He asserts,
however, that section 3344(d) only applies to factual
3
reporting. In essence, he asserts that section 3344(d)
applies to the same type of “reporting” as does the
public interest defense.
Neither party offered direct authority on the type
of use for which the section 3344(d) exemption applies.
3

EA understands Plaintiff to argue that reporting implicates
newsworthy information. So interpreted, EA claims, Plaintiff’s
argument must fail because Dora draws a distinction between
“news” and “public affairs.” The Court does not construe Plaintiff’s
argument in the same way. Instead, the Court reads Plaintiff to
argue that “NCAA Football” does not constitute “reporting” and,
as a result, EA does not use his name and likeness in a manner
that is exempted by section 3344(d).
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However, Montana is instructive. There, the court
stated that “the statutory cause of action specifically
exempts from liability the use of a name or likeness in
connection with the reporting of a matter in the public
interest.” 34 Cal.App.4th at 793, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 639
(emphasis added). Thus, without authority requiring
otherwise, the Court construes section 3344(d) to
require the same type of activity as the public interest
4
defense discussed above, namely reporting. Although
“NCAA Football” is based on subject matter
considered “public affairs,” EA is not entitled to the
statutory defense because its use of Plaintiff’s image
and likeness extends beyond reporting information
about him.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s California statutory and
common law right of publicity claims are not barred as
a matter of law. III. Civil Conspiracy Claims
Defendants move separately to dismiss Plaintiff’s
civil conspiracy claims. All challenge the sufficiency of
Plaintiff’s claims, arguing that he does not plead an
underlying tort, which is a necessary element. CLC
separately asserts the agent immunity defense.
Plaintiff did not specify the state law under which
his civil conspiracy claims arise. For the purposes of
this motion, the Court assumes that his claims arise
under California law.
4

Although section 3344(d) and the public interest defense implicate the same type of activity, they are nonetheless not coextensive because section 3344(d) defines safe harbors for reporting in
particular contexts. See New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 310
n.10.
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D. Sufficiency of the Claims
Civil conspiracy “is not a cause of action, but a legal
doctrine that imposes liability on persons who, although
not actually committing a tort themselves, share with
the immediate tortfeasors a common plan or design in
its perpetration.” Applied Equipment Corp., 7 Cal.4th
at 510, 28 Cal.Rptr.2d 475, 869 P.2d 454 (citing Wyatt v.
Union Mortgage Co., 24 Cal.3d 773, 784, 157 Cal.Rptr.
392, 598 P.2d 45 (1979)). “Standing alone, a conspiracy
does no harm and engenders no tort liability. It must be
activated by the commission of an actual tort.” Applied
Equipment Corp., 7 Cal.4th at 511, 28 Cal.Rptr.2d 475,
869 P.2d 454.
A claim for civil conspiracy consists of three
elements: “(1) the formation and operation of the
conspiracy, (2) wrongful conduct in furtherance of the
conspiracy, and (3) damages arising from the wrongful
conduct.” Kidron v. Movie Acquisition Corp., 40
Cal.App.4th 1571, 1581, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 752 (1995). “The
conspiring defendants must ... have actual knowledge
that a tort is planned and concur in the tortious scheme
with knowledge of its unlawful purpose.” Id. at 1582, 47
Cal.Rptr.2d 752 (citing Wyatt, 24 Cal.3d at 784–86, 157
Cal.Rptr. 392, 598 P.2d 45). This knowledge must be
combined with an intent to aid in achieving the
objective of the conspiracy. Kidron, 40 Cal.App.4th at
1582, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 752; Schick v. Bach, 193
Cal.App.3d 1321, 1328, 238 Cal.Rptr. 902 (1987). A claim
of unlawful conspiracy must contain “enough fact to
raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will
reveal evidence of illegal agreement.” Twombly, 550
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U.S. at 556. A bare allegation that a conspiracy existed
does not suffice. Id.
Plaintiff alleges that there were meetings among
Defendants in California and Indiana. Compl. ¶¶ 54–56.
He asserts that Defendants knew of NCAA principles
barring the licensing of student-athlete identities, but
nonetheless approved EA’s games containing the
athletes’ likenesses without their consent. Compl. ¶¶
12–15. Finally, he claims that EA’s actions violated his
California statutory and common law rights of
5
publicity. These factual allegations sufficiently support
6
liability under Plaintiff’s civil conspiracy claim.

5

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants conspired to deprive “class
members of their right to protect their names, likenesses and
rights to publicity and their contractual, property rights.” Compl.
¶ 80. For the purposes of this motion, the Court construes this allegation to refer to EA’s alleged violation of Plaintiff’s California
right of publicity because he does not state a claim based on the
tortious conduct of any other Defendant.

6

Citing Everest Investors 8 v. Whitehall Real Estate Limited
Partnership XI, 100 Cal.App.4th 1102, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 297 (2002),
CLC also argues that it cannot accrue tort liability under a civil
conspiracy theory because Plaintiff has not alleged that it can
make video games. This argument is unavailing. Everest Investors
8 states that “tort liability from a conspiracy presupposes that the
conspirator is legally capable of committing the tort—that he owes
a duty to the plaintiff recognized by law and is potentially subject
to liability for the breach of that duty.” Id. at 1106, 123
Cal.Rptr.2d 297. Nothing in the record indicates that CLC is legally incapable of violating Plaintiff’s rights of publicity.
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E. CLC’s Agent Immunity Defense
CLC maintains that the agent immunity defense
bars Plaintiff’s conspiracy claim against it. This defense
provides that no liability shall lie “if the alleged
conspirator, though a participant in the agreement
underlying the injury, was not personally bound by the
duty violated by the wrongdoing and was acting only as
the agent or employee of the party who did have that
duty.” Doctors’ Co. v. Superior Court, 49 Cal.3d 39, 44,
260 Cal.Rptr. 183, 775 P.2d 508 (1989).
CLC maintains that Plaintiff’s allegations that its
role as a licensing company entering into agreements
on behalf of NCAA establishes, as a matter of law, that
it is NCAA’s agent. These allegations are not sufficient
at this early stage to establish CLC’s entitlement to
this defense.
III.

Section 17200 Claim

EA maintains that Plaintiff fails to state a claim
under California Business and Professions Code section
17200 because he does not allege an underlying wrong
or seek available relief. However, as discussed above,
Plaintiff sufficiently asserts right of publicity and civil
conspiracy claims. With regard to relief, he seeks an
injunction, which EA concedes is available under
section 17200. Thus, Plaintiff has stated a section 17200
claim against EA.
IV.

Breach of Contract Claim

NCAA argues that Plaintiff does not state a breach
of contract claim because he has not identified an
enforceable contract. Because Plaintiff does not specify
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the state law under which his claim arises, the Court
assumes that California law applies.
To assert a cause of action for breach of contract in
California, a plaintiff must plead: (1) existence of a
contract; (2) the plaintiff’s performance or excuse for
non-performance; the defendant’s breach; and (4)
damages to the plaintiff as a result of the breach.
Armstrong Petrol. Corp. v. Tri–Valley Oil & Gas Co.,
116 Cal.App.4th 1375, 1391 n. 6, 11 Cal.Rptr.3d 412
(2004).
Plaintiff has not identified a contract that he is
seeking to enforce. Although he refers to an NCAA
document as a contract, he does not attach the
document to his complaint. Instead, he states that by
signing the document, the athletes agree that “they
have ‘read and understand’ the NCAA’s rules” and that
“to the best of [their] knowledge [they] have not
violated any amateurism rules.” Compl. ¶ 14. These
phrases, on their own, do not indicate that the
document is a contract. Plaintiff’s breach of contract
claim against NCAA is dismissed with leave to amend
to allege or attach an enforceable contract.
V.

Unjust Enrichment Claims

Plaintiff claims that EA and CLC were unjustly
enriched through the sale of video games that use his
likeness. EA and CLC argue that his claim is barred
because California law does not provide a cause of
action for unjust enrichment. Even if it did, EA and
CLC argue, Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the
existence of a contract with NCAA would
independently bar an unjust enrichment claim.
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California courts appear to be split on whether
there is an independent cause of action for unjust
enrichment. Baggett v. Hewlett–Packard Co., 582 F.
Supp. 2d 1261, 1270–71 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (applying
California law). One view is that unjust enrichment is
not a cause of action, or even a remedy, but rather a
general principle, underlying various legal doctrines
and remedies. McBride v. Boughton, 123 Cal.App.4th
379, 387, 20 Cal.Rptr.3d 115 (2004). In McBride, the
court construed a “purported” unjust enrichment claim
as a cause of action seeking restitution. Id. There are at
least two potential bases for a cause of action seeking
restitution: (1) an alternative to breach of contract
damages when the parties had a contract which was
procured by fraud or is unenforceable for some reason;
and (2) where the defendant obtained a benefit from the
plaintiff by fraud, duress, conversion, or similar conduct
and the plaintiff chooses not to sue in tort but to seek
restitution on a quasi-contract theory. Id. at 388, 20
Cal.Rptr.3d 115. In the latter case, the law implies a
contract, or quasi-contract, without regard to the
parties’ intent, to avoid unjust enrichment. Id.
Another view is that a cause of action for unjust
enrichment exists and its elements are receipt of a
benefit and unjust retention of the benefit at the
expense of another. Lectrodryer v. SeoulBank, 77
Cal.App.4th 723, 726, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 881 (2000); First
Nationwide Savings v. Perry, 11 Cal.App.4th 1657,
1662–63, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 173 (1992).
Even under the more restrictive analysis of
McBride, Plaintiff sufficiently pleads claims for
restitution against EA and CLC on the theory that
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they obtained a benefit from him through their alleged
wrongful conduct. His breach of contract claim against
NCAA does not bar these claims. Although EA and
CLC correctly note that the existence of such a
contract could bar a restitutionary claim against a
contracting party, it is not clear that his alleged
contract with NCAA defined any rights between him
and EA and CLC. Cf. Cal. Med. Ass’n v. Aetna U.S.
Healthcare of Cal., 94 Cal.App.4th 151, 172, 114
Cal.Rptr.2d 109 (2001) (holding that “as a matter of law,
a quasi-contract action for unjust enrichment does not
lie where, as here, express binding agreements exist
and define the parties’ rights”). Thus, Plaintiff has
adequately stated his unjust enrichment claim for
restitution against EA and CLC.
VI.

EA’s Anti–SLAPP Motion to Strike

Finally, EA moves under California Code of Civil
Procedure section 425.16 to strike all of Plaintiff’s
claims against it. Section 425.16(b)(1), which addresses
Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation
(SLAPP), provides,
A cause of action against a person arising from
any act of that person in furtherance of the
person’s right of petition or free speech under
the United States or California Constitution in
connection with a public issue shall be subject to
a special motion to strike, unless the court
determines that the plaintiff has established that
there is a probability that the plaintiff will
prevail on the claim.
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California anti-SLAPP motions are available to
litigants proceeding in federal court. Thomas v. Fry’s
Elecs., Inc., 400 F.3d 1206, 1206 (9th Cir. 2005).
California courts analyze anti-SLAPP motions in two
steps. “First, the court decides whether the defendant
has made a threshold showing that the challenged
cause of action is one arising from protected activity.”
Equilon Enter. v. Consumer Cause, Inc., 29 Cal.4th 53,
67, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 507, 52 P.3d 685 (2002). Second, the
court “determines whether the plaintiff has
demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the claim.”
Id.
Assuming that the challenged causes of action arise
from protected activity, Plaintiff makes a sufficient
showing of his probability of success on the merits. EA
incorrectly argues that Plaintiff has a substantial
burden to show probability of success. It maintains that
the Court must apply “the same standard governing
motions for summary judgment, nonsuit, or directed
verdict.” EA’s Mot. to Strike at 12. However, this
standard does not apply in federal court.
“At the second step of the anti-SLAPP inquiry, the
required probability that [a party] will prevail need not
be high.” Hilton, 580 F.3d at 888–89. The “statute does
not bar a plaintiff from litigating an action that arises
out of the defendant’s free speech or petitioning; it
subjects to potential dismissal only those actions in
which the plaintiff cannot state and substantiate a
legally sufficient claim.” Id. at 888 (quoting Navellier v.
Sletten, 29 Cal.4th 82, 93, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 530, 52 P.3d
703 (2002)) (quotation marks omitted). In Thomas v.
Fry’s Electronics, the case that provides that
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anti-SLAPP motions are available to litigants
proceeding in federal court, the court stated that
“federal courts may not impose a heightened pleading
requirement in derogation of federal notice pleading
rules.” 400 F.3d at 1207; see also Empress LLC v. City
& County of S.F., 419 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir.2005)
(holding that “a heightened pleading standard should
only be applied when the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure so require”); Verizon, Inc. v. Covad
Commc’ns. Co., 377 F.3d 1081, 1091 (9th Cir. 2004)
(holding that procedural “state laws are not used in
federal court if to do so would result in a direct collision
with a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure” and noting that
federal courts have “accordingly refused to apply
certain
discovery-limiting
provisions
of
the
anti-SLAPP statute because they would conflict with
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56”).
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, Plaintiff
has sufficiently stated his claims against EA.
Accordingly, the Court denies EA’s special motion to
strike Plaintiff’s claims as a SLAPP.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES
EA’s Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 34), GRANTS
NCAA’s Motion in part and DENIES it in part (Docket
No. 48), DENIES CLC’s Motion (Docket No. 47) and
DENIES EA’s Motion to Strike (Docket No. 35).
Plaintiff’s claims for violation of his Indiana right of
publicity and breach of contract against NCAA are
dismissed with leave to amend. In accordance with this
Court’s Order of January 15, 2010 on consolidation,
Plaintiff has thirty days from the date of this Order to
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file a consolidated amended complaint. A case
management conference is scheduled for April 27, 2010
at 2:00 p.m.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
_____________________________________
In re: NCAA STUDENT-ATHLETE
NAME & LIKENESS LICENSING
LITIGATION,
_____________________________________
SAMUEL MICHAEL KELLER;
EDWARD C. O’BANNON, Jr.; BYRON
BISHOP; MICHAEL ANDERSON;
DANNY WIMPRINE; ISHMAEL
THROWER; CRAIG NEWSOME;
DAMIEN RHODES; SAMUEL
JACOBSON,
Plaintiffs – Appellees,
v.
ELECTRONIC ARTS INC.,
Defendant – Appellant,
And
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION; COLLEGIATE
LICENSING COMPANY,
Defendants.
_____________________________________

No. 10-15387
D.C. No. 4:09-cv01967-CW
Northern District
of California,
Oakland

ORDER
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Before: THOMAS and BYBEE, Circuit Judges, and
QUIST, Senior District Judge.
Filed Aug. 21, 2013
Appellant’s motion for stay of the issuance of the
mandate pending application for writ of certiorari is
GRANTED. Fed. R. App. P. 41(b).
Therefore, it is ordered that the mandate is stayed
pending the filing of the petition for writ of certiorari in
the Supreme Court. The stay shall continue until final
disposition by the Supreme Court.

